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Abstract 
 
 The Arctic is rapidly changing due to global warming, causing both challenges and 
opportunities for the Arctic countries. Norway has ever since 2005 named the High North its’ 
most strategic and important foreign policy area, and has published several policy statements 
in the past decade. These policy papers lay the foundation for the Government’s actions in the 
High North, and becomes a crucial field of study in order to gain knowledge and insight into 
the processes leading up to final decision making.  
 Discourse analysis has been the preferred approach by many scholars when analysing 
policy papers. Through conducting a discourse analysis, representations, story-lines and 
interdiscursivity can be detected; unravelling the meanings of the policy papers. In this thesis, 
I want to discover the main story-lines and representations that supports the Governments 
further plans for petroleum exploration in the High North vis a vis environmental governance 
in the region. This is done to highlight the oft-opposing discourses and policies that enables 
several paradoxes to develop. First, the Arctic is experiencing unprecedented warming due to 
global fossil fuel consumption, which again will enable further fossil fuel exploitation that 
leads to increased global warming. Second, Norway claims to be a ‘steward’ of the Arctic 
environment, while at the same time wanting to expand the industry with the worst impact on 
the environment.  
 In wake of this, I highlight three central discourses that represent the Government’s 
main petroleum policy, namely; ‘drilling for aid’, natural gas as a ‘bridging fuel’ and ‘drilling 
for the environment’. I also investigate whether there is a development of the High North 
petroleum discourse in the policy statements from the previous to the current Government. I 
find that there is a visible ‘intensification’ of the petroleum discourse, as the current 
Government wants to go ‘from word to action’ in the High North policy. However, a 
discrepancy in the translation between the English and Norwegian version of the latest Report 
highlights a possible conflicting discourse with unknown meanings.  
 Finally, I look at the widening of the High North security agenda in a post-structuralist 
securitization framework, where I conclude that the Arctic security agenda has been widened 
to include energy, economic, social and environmental security. However, there is a tendency 
of looking at the environmental consequences of global warming in an opportunistic and 
positive light, as it enables further resource exploration. Bringing in a ‘human security’ 
approach, would help to nuance this development, by highlighting the individual security 
concerns of the millions of people being affected by climate change in the Arctic.  
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1  Background 
“The melting ice of the Arctic is a barometer for the global warming that may cause 
unimaginable damage to our planet. We, citizens of the Arctic, can see climate change taking 
place with our naked eyes. It is obvious that we have to commit to the international 
cooperation to combat climate change (…) As the ice retreats, the Arctic countries will no 
longer be divided by the ice, but connected by the ocean. The sea will become a highway, not 
a barrier. It will open up new possibilities for trade and transport; mining and minerals; oil 
and gas; research and education”.  
(Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende, Article in Harvard International Review, 
16.04.2015) 
 The Arctic is a symptomatic example of the core ecological and economical 
crossroads at which the world has now arrived. It symbolizes on the one hand the strong and 
unparalleled forces of global human induced climate change, as we see the Arctic changing 
right before our eyes. The consequences of a warmer Arctic range from local stresses to 
biodiversity, threats to indigenous livelihoods and health, extinction of species and 
introduction of foreign specimens, to global rises in sea-level, salinization of the oceans, 
changes in currents and the speeding up of global warming due to feedback mechanisms of 
the opening Arctic waters. These environmental changes are hard to predict and concretize; 
we know there is a great likelihood that it will occur, but we do not know how fast these 
changes will come about. The Norwegian Government acknowledges that climate change is 
taking place, that it is human-made and that the world has to come together to deal with these 
changes in order to limit the fatal consequences of global warming. On the flipside, as the ice 
melts, the Arctic oceans will ‘open’ up for new opportunities. These opportunities include a 
possibility for further fossil fuel exploration, more fishing grounds and a new northern sea 
route linking Asia to Europe. For some of the Arctic states, these opportunities can ensure 
economic growth, local development and value-creation and enable increased welfare for the 
entire nation. A melting Arctic threatens the security for many people, while at the same time 
safeguards security for others. How we act in the Arctic can both set the tone and precedence 
for how one should act with the challenges and opportunities of climate change in the rest of 
the world. 
 Norway has, over the past 40 years, developed into a petroleum nation. Our economy 
is dependent on a high level of resource exploration to cater for a large state apparatus and 
comprehensive welfare system. In the early days of our oil age, the Government implemented 
a policy of ‘moderation’ in order to avoid overheating our economy and growing too 
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economically dependent on the oil revenues. Furthermore, the Government decided to keep 
the oil exploration limited to the North Sea, in spite of expected large oil reserves outside the 
Lofoten area. Nevertheless, in the 1990s and 2000s, the previous policies of moderation were 
abandoned and the level of petroleum extraction reached a record high and set a standard for 
further high levels of petroleum development. In addition, a national oil fund (Pension Fund) 
was established to keep Norway away from the ‘resource curse’ or the ‘Dutch disease’, while 
enabling a high production level. However, it is believed that Norway has reached ‘peak oil’, 
as production level of oil and the overall production levels of fossil fuels have declined 
steadily from the beginning of the 2000s (Ryggvik, 2010; Kristoffersen & Young, 2010). 
Since 2005, Norway has named the Arctic as its most important foreign policy priority; a time 
coinciding with an increasing focus on the melting ice and uncovering of the potential vast 
petroleum resources available when the ice melts1.  
 Here lies the core paradox of the Arctic and of the world. A globalized world with 
massive fossil fuel consumption has led to global warming and climate change, which in turn 
enables further fossil fuel exploration that will lead to more global warming2.  
 For many, the Arctic stands as the last pristine frontier in the world. An ice-covered 
region with rare species and invaluable ecosystems, eternal night and eternal days, and with 
the magnificent Aurelia borealis dancing over the night sky in the landscape of eternal winter. 
More so, it is the home of over 4 million people living in eight Arctic countries, with almost 
half a million indigenous people, who have lived in the Arctic for thousands of years. While 
studying International Environmental Studies at the Norwegian University of Life Science 
(NMBU), I have become increasingly occupied with the future of the region and what I 
experience as an intensification of the political discourse around future Arctic petroleum 
exploration in the media in recent times. I was furthermore surprised by the lack of attention 
from the faculty towards what is going on in the North, and what some of the major obstacles 
to Norwegian contributions to solve global environmental problems are. Driven by these 
concerns, I became interested in analysing the Norwegian High North policy papers with the 
aim to unravel some of the main representations and story-lines that forms the core 
Norwegian Arctic discourse. Why does Norway want to intensify petroleum exploration in the 
                                                 
1 A much-sited US Geology Survey from 2008 concludes that almost a quarter of the world’s undiscovered 
petroleum resources are located under the Arctic ice. This will be further discussed in the analysis.  
2 Leichenko and O’Brien (2008) develop this idea of ‘double exposure’ in their book Environmental Change and 
Globalization, and will be further discussed in the analysis of this thesis. 
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High North, in the midst of the last ‘pristine frontier’ in the world? What are the narratives 
that support such an exploration in the Arctic, and has there been a development from the 
previous Government to the one that sits now and has been in power for two years? These are 
some of the questions I will consider in this thesis.  
1.2  Literature review   
One of the first researchers to turn towards the High North was Geir Hønneland 
(2005), with his work on Norwegian High North politics after the Cold War, where the 
relation between Norway and Russia is a central theme. Moreover, he identifies some key 
discourses in the High North politics, including Norwegian identity discourse and the 
environmental discourse around Russia as an environmental foe. Hønneland and Jensen 
(2008) develop this initial research on the High North politics in their book The new High 
North politics3, where they look at the Norwegian High North policies after the turn of the 
century and include research on the petroleum and environmental policy-making. This is 
where the discourse ‘drilling for the environment’ began to take shape, which was based on 
the idea that since Russia was drilling in the Arctic, Norway had to follow suit to ensure high 
environmental standards. Leif Christian Jensen (2010) took the ‘drilling for the environment’ 
discourse further by introducing the concept of ‘discourse co-optation’. This is when one side 
of the debate [pro drilling in the Arctic] takes the core argument of the opposing discourse [no 
drilling, for environmental concerns], turns it on its head and makes it their key argument for 
drilling. It was this early research of Leif Christian Jensen which made me want to look closer 
at the High North discourse, as I became aware of the power of meaning and story-lines in 
policy-forming.  
Jensen has pursued his interest in High North discourse analysis further, and in 2012, 
he published a PhD titled Norway on a High in the North that compiled of five articles 
published in the period 2007-2012. In addition to developing the themes ‘discourse co-
optation’, drilling for the environment, and analysing Russia-Norway relations in the North, 
he also adapts a post-structuralist approach to securitization of the High North. He takes these 
themes further in his forthcoming book International Relations in the Arctic: Norway and the 
struggle for power in the New North4(Jensen, 2015). Jensen’s significant research in this field 
has clearly served as a stepping-stone for my research, where I attempt to develop his ideas 
with the more recent policy statements on the High North as his research includes the 
                                                 
3 «Den nye nordområdepolitikken» 
4 Title suggested by the publishers, not finalized as far as I know.  
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Government’s High North policy-papers only up until 2009. Grindheim (2009) conducts a 
discourse analysis on Norway’s and the EU’s strategies towards the Arctic and whether there 
is a ‘scramble’ for the natural resources between the Arctic states. Stokke (2007; 2011) 
explores the ‘Arctic scramble’ further and looks in general at Arctic security and 
environmental security in the Arctic. His main message is that the Arctic governance structure 
is strong and dynamic enough to withstand the ‘ongoing race for natural resources’. 
Hoogensen et al. (2009) and Hoogensen Gjørv, Bazely, Goloviznina and Tanentzap (2014) 
develops the concept of ‘human security’ in the Arctic, and how it matters in the 
‘widening/deepening’ discourse of the Arctic security agenda.  
Kristoffersen and Young (2010), Kristoffersen (2014) and Kristoffersen (2015) also 
provide a broad research on the Norwegian High North politics, discourse and security issues. 
Berit Kristoffersen (2014) recently published a PhD titled Drilling oil into Arctic minds, 
which is a compilation of four journal papers and book chapters from the period 2010-2015, 
with the subject-matter ranging from the state space and security in the High North to the 
development of the concept ‘opportunistic adaptation’, which I have adopted into my 
analysis. She conceptualizes the emerging policy of how the Government approaches 
environmental change in the Arctic from an opportunistic and positive side, rather than 
admitting that further petroleum exploration in the region is only going to contribute to 
increasing global warming and melting in the Arctic.   
Ihlen (2007) and Ryggvik (2010; 2013) look closer at the petroleum industry in 
Norway and the links between the industry and the state. Ihlen (2007) writes about the 
Norwegian oil industry’s strategic communication and reputation building and in the section 
on climate change and the oil industry, he highlights that the climate debate can pose some 
difficult questions for the industry, and that their ‘sustainable’ petroleum exploration 
discourse can consequently lead to the downfall of the industry’s reputation.  
 
This thesis contributes to existing research by tracing recent continuances or shifts in 
the established discourse around petroleum and environment in recent policy documents 
focused on the High North. Political discourse is an ever-changing field of arguments, 
narratives, representations and assumptions. To highlight and detect these continuing 
meanings in the discourse adds to the established knowledge-bank and enables fluidity in the 
field of study.  
 
5 
 
1.3  Research questions and contributions   
According to a recent study conducted by McGlade and Ekins (2015), a third of the global 
oil reserves, a half of the world gas reserves and over 80 percent of existing coal reserves 
need to remain unused from 2010-2050 in order to meet the globally established target of no 
more than 2 degrees of warming. Furthermore, they show that resource development in the 
Arctic and increasing development of unconventional oil production are “incommensurate 
with efforts to limit global warming to 2oC” (McGlade & Ekins, 2015, p. 187). These findings 
stand in stark contrast with the current Norwegian High North policy discourse, which 
underlines the need for an ‘intensification’ of the petroleum development in the Norwegian 
Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a). The continuing juxtaposition between Norwegian 
petroleum and environmental policies - especially seen in light of the Norwegian 
characteristic of being an ‘environmental state’- led to my interest in dismantling and 
analysing the current policy-making in the High North. As the title In oil we trust, highlights, 
it becomes clear that Norway is following a policy of maintaining high petroleum production, 
almost at any cost. What led to my research questions is that this is done under the same 
banner as being a ‘steward’ of the Arctic environment. Therefore, I posed the following 
research questions: 
1. Why does Norway want to carry on oil exploration in the last ‘pristine frontier’ in the 
world?  
2. What are the story-lines and representations being created to support oil exploration in 
the Arctic?  
3. In what ways is the newly instated Government from 2013 developing the discourse 
around petroleum and environmental policies in the Arctic? 
4. Why should we talk about a ‘widening’ of the Arctic security agenda, and why is the 
concept of ‘human security’ important in the case of the Arctic?  
 
I look at the policy-papers published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the last five 
years, from 2009-2014, in addition to the most recent speeches and statements made by the 
Foreign Minister on the Government’s Arctic policies. In a further study or an extended 
thesis, I would have included policy papers from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and 
the Ministry of Climate and Environment in order to trace the main contradictions and points 
of cooperation between the two institutions. I would furthermore have attempted to conduct 
interviews with relevant representatives from the ministries and the petroleum industry. 
6 
 
Moreover, a further field of study of the human security agenda in the Arctic should be based 
on comprehensive interviews and questionnaires of both locals and indigenous people living 
in midst of environmental change and petroleum opportunities as this seems lacking from the 
Norwegian field of study of human security in the Arctic.  
1.4  The background for the High North policy  
First, I should establish what the Government puts in the wording ‘the High North’ and 
my understanding of this term. In its most direct sense, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
official definition from 2003 of a title that contained the Norwegian word; Nordområdene 
(literally translates to ‘the northern areas’ in English) (Skagestad, 2010). However, the 
ambiguities of the definition is describes by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their second 
High North strategy paper: 
No precise definition of the “High North” has been provided in the Norwegian 
political debate. The horizon is broader than Northern Norway and Svalbard since 
Norway has major interests to safeguard in a greater region. When the Government’s 
High North Strategy was developed in 2006, the High North referred to the areas 
surrounding the Barents Sea. This is really a Norwegian perspective. With regard to 
closer international cooperation, we must bear in mind that the High North is 
gradually becoming more synonymous with the Arctic. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2009, p. 50) 
 
The definition of the ‘Arctic’, whether it is the area North of 66o33’ N, or land and island 
north of the tree line, or where the median July temperature is +10oC, are all bound to the area 
defining the Arctic (Skagestad, 2010). This is not synonymous with the High North. However, 
as none of the other Arctic states have developed their own concept of the High North in the 
same way as Norway, I use the Norwegian Arctic or the High North interchangeably in this 
thesis. This is in accordance with both the policy papers and in the secondary literature.   
Although not a strictly new concept or policy area, the declaration by previous Foreign 
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre in 2005 that the High North was now the first priority of 
Norwegian Foreign policy, acted – at least on a rhetorical level- as something new in 
Norwegian foreign policy (Hønneland & Jensen, 2008). Until the beginning of the new 
millennia, there had not been an overarching High North policy under the Norwegian 
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Government. Thus, the Norwegian Government Official Report5  Towards the North (Mot 
Nord!) from 2003, the White paper from the Bondevik Government Opportunities and 
Challenges in the North (Muligheter og Utfordringer I Nord) from 2005, and the High North 
Strategy (Nordområdestrategi) from 2006 – comprises what Hønneland and Jensen (2008) call 
the ‘new High North politics’. This is the starting point from where the subsequent High 
North policy papers follow, and what I used as the basis for my analysis. In the strategy from 
2006, with its second addition published in 2009, the Government highlights seven priority 
areas for policy making in the High North (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009): 
 
1. We will exercise our authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and 
predictable way.  
2. We will be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and about 
the High North.  
3. We intend to be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the 
High North.  
4. We will provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum 
activities in the Barents Sea, and will seek to ensure that these activities boost 
competence in Norway in general and in North Norway in particular, and foster 
local and regional business development. 
5. We intend the High North policy to play a role in safeguarding the livelihoods, 
traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples in the High North.  
6. We will further develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North.  
7. We will strengthen our cooperation with Russia. (p. 6) 
 
The third and fourth policy areas are the focus for my analysis, while the other policy 
areas all form a part of the overall High North discourse and security concerns. 
1.5  The structure of the thesis  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 describes the underlying methodology and 
why I chose discourse analysis as the method for my thesis. Moreover, discourse analysis is 
presented both as a method and as a theory in its own right, which carries with it 
epistemological assumptions about how meanings and knowledge are created and reproduced. 
                                                 
5 «offentlig utredning – NOU» 
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Chapter 3 outlines further theoretical assumptions that make up a framework composed of 
several theories. First, the state as an actor in environmental governance is described, 
followed by an outline of the Copenhagen School of securitization theory and the revised 
post-structuralist approach to securitization. Finally, I include the concept of ‘human security’ 
in the Arctic as a vital component of ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ the Arctic security agenda. 
Chapter 4 and 5 are the analytical chapters, where statements from the policy-papers from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs form the empirical backbone of the discourse analysis, supported 
by secondary sources. Chapter 4 outlines the current petroleum and environmental policy 
discourse, sets in in a historic perspective, and identifies three main story-lines and 
representations defending the development of resource exploration in the High North. The 
first is ‘drilling as foreign aid’, the second is ‘natural gas as a bridging fuel’, and the third is 
‘drilling for the environment’. Chapter 5 analyses the discourse around the ‘widening’ of the 
Arctic security agenda as it appears in the policy-statements, and frame it within a post-
structuralist approach to securitization theory. ‘Energy security’ has become a central concept 
in the Arctic security vocabulary, while ‘human security’ and ‘environmental security’ are 
somewhat more diffuse. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and makes concluding remarks, 
while at the same time suggests some future points of interest in the Norwegian High North 
policy, as a lot is currently taking place in the wake of the global drop in the oil prices, 
affecting the future of Arctic petroleum politics.  
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2.0 Methodology 
This section goes through the choice of method that forms the backbone of this thesis. 
I first present discourse analysis as both a research method and as a theoretical approach. In 
the latter part of the section, I go through some of the assumptions of environmental discourse 
analysis and critical discourse analysis. In accordance with previous studies of Norwegian oil 
and environmental policy making in the High North, such as Jensen and Skedsmo (2010), 
Jensen (2012; 2015), Kristoffersen (2014) and Grindheim (2009), discourse analysis has been 
a preferred choice of method due to its analytical and explanatory powers. My thesis, in its 
most basic form, is a presentation of the Norwegian government’s exercise of power. Framing 
discourse is consequently about who has the power to set something on the agenda, and to 
exercise this power over others, as well as making that a part of everyone’s reality and truth 
(Jensen, 2015). Hence, using discourse analysis as a way of understanding and drawing out 
the underlying assumptions in Norway’s High North policy seems to be an advantageous and 
fruitful course of action.  
2.1 Why use discourse analysis as an analytical tool? 
Reading my first policy paper on the Norwegian Government’s High North policy, I 
became aware that there was a certain tone in the text; a style of writing and a seemingly 
contradictory voice throughout the paper. What fascinated me more than anything was how 
style and tone were applied in a way to smooth over any possible conflicting areas in the 
politics. When I proceeded to read the secondary literature on these official papers, I received 
a confirmation that other well-distinguished researchers (Jensen, 2012, 2015; Kristoffersen, 
2014, Grindheim, 2009) also saw this contradictory voice and lack of a unified direction in the 
High North policy. This set me on the course of using discourse analysis to investigate these 
observations further in a methodological approach in order to systematize my thoughts. 
Moreover, the policy papers are not mere words on a piece of paper, it is ultimately a way for 
the Norwegian Government to justify and set the scene for present and future action in the 
area. Jensen (2015) defends his reasoning for using discourse as an analytical tool and as a 
prerequisite for political action in the following way: 
The discourse are interesting from the moment they become or come across as 
politically relevant regardless of ulterior motives or hidden agendas that might or 
might not lay behind them. The purpose of discourse analysis is not to find a different 
perspective or look for alternative agenda, discourse produce reality; therefore it is 
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meaningful and relevant to study them as preconditions for actions (Jensen, 2015, 
n.p.). 
2.2 Discourse in social science  
There is, according to Klotz (2008), an on-going struggle between positivist views and 
post-modernist views of the role of epistemological approaches towards research in political 
science and in the study of international policy formation. Epistemology is about how one 
creates and reproduces meaning and knowledge, as opposed to ontological premises that 
concerns itself with the basics of nature and existence (Jensen, 2015). The positivist approach 
gives little room for the interpretation of meaning, which makes it hard to find a meeting point 
to discuss the rhetoric in policy-making (Klotz, 2008). Jensen (2015) justifies using discourse 
analysis to unravel meanings in the following statement: 
The world, from a discourse-analytical perspective, cannot have a definitive structural 
meaning, as, for instance, Marxism assumes. On the other hand, the generation of 
meaning cannot be traced back to the human subject’s personal interpretation of the 
world. There is, quite simply, no ontologically privileged position from which to 
understand the creation of meaning and signification. Meaning is installed and constituted 
in specific historical contexts with mutually constituting elements of signification called 
discourses. It is a tenet of discourse analysis that social structures and identities are 
formed by discourses, which thereby become the axes around which the determination of 
meaning revolves.(n.p.) 
 The debate tends to be driven by the theoretical underpinnings of epistemology and 
ontology, rather than having a focus on the practicality of methodology. Shifting the focus to 
the practicality of methodology henceforth justifies and supports the decision for using 
discourse analysis as a methodological approach to interpret the underlying assumptions and 
meaning of policy-making. Discourse analysis as a methodology includes both theory and 
method, and one has to base it on the epistemological principles put forward (Jensen, 2015). 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006), “[g]ood social science is problem driven and not methodology 
driven in the sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help 
answer the research questions at hand” (p. 242).  
In accordance with Neumann (2008), language represents a social system that sets 
everything in relation to each other and creates logic; it serves as ‘the outlet’ for our senses. 
Discourse is as a way to disseminate and analyse the representation of language production, 
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and when these representations are conveyed repeatedly, they develop into institutionalized 
statements and practices that becomes the ‘norm’ or ‘truth’ in time (Neumann, 2008). Alas, 
this becomes evident when conducting a discourse analysis, where one of the methods of 
showing a text’s representations is by proving the reoccurrence of certain metaphors in the 
same text. An example of a representation that creates a ‘norm’ or ‘truth’ in the Norwegian 
Strategy paper on the High North from 2009 is seen in the way Norway is described as 
‘unique’, a ‘world leader’ or a ‘pioneer’ in most aspects of both Arctic resource development 
and environmental protection. While reading the paper, under numerous occasions, it is 
brought to our attention that Norway is ‘special’ and ‘important’ internationally, underlying 
the sense of ownership and stewardship that Norway has in the Arctic. This kind of 
representation links to the overall tone of voice and approach that the Government shows in 
the policy papers, and becomes an essential part of the High North discourse, which will be 
further elaborated on in the analysis.    
Discourse analysis as a research method has many branches across many research 
disciplines. For a linguist, discourse analysis concerns itself primarily with the written word, 
the grammar and sentence structure. While for a social scientist, the motive for conducting a 
discourse analysis stretches beyond analysing the written word to analyse underlying 
meanings. There appears to be a lack of a single approach to discourse analysis, leaving the 
researcher to their own devices, following certain approaches and excluding others (Gee, 
2011). The natural approach for me is to develop upon what other researchers have done 
when analysing the topic of Norwegian High North policy. The following interpretations or 
definitions of discourse analysis serve as the core foundation of how I follow this method and 
theory in my thesis. As I am more concerned with ‘meanings’ and going ‘beyond the word’ 
when conducting the discourse analysis, Foucault’s much sited definition acts as a starting 
point: “[w]e will call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same 
discursive formation (…) it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of 
conditions of existence can be defined” (Foucault, 1972, p. 117, sited in Jensen, 2015, n.p.). 
This way of defining discourse also entails exclusion, as only a few people might 
legitimize the text’s content and participate in its formation. Individual texts are not 
meaningful in themselves, but it is when seen in the light of their “interconnectedness with 
other texts, the different discourses on which they draw, and the nature of their production, 
dissemination, and consumption that they are made meaningful” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, 3-4, 
sited in Jensen, 2015, n.p.). When looking further at other definitions of discourse analysis, 
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the core concept of analysing language is the key theme, while the ways in which one 
approaches it might vary. Hajer’s (1995) defines discourse as: “(…) a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a 
particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social 
realities.” (p. 44) 
In the view of Hajer (1995), discourse analysis arose from a wider tradition of post-
positivist interpretations. Interpretive social science can be seen as a move away from a 
natural science focus on causality and uncovering general laws (generalization). Instead, there 
is a focus on uncovering the deeper “meaning of certain social processes in society and to 
trace the various conceptual connections” (Hajer, 1995, p. 43). As discourse analysis is 
interpretive in nature, it also becomes interpretive in the way it is being set up and defined by 
various researchers. As previously mentioned, it is the researcher’s job when conducting a 
discourse analysis, to unravel the discursive paths when analysing the material at hand. There 
is a wide array of tools and methods one can use, and I have, in the course of my analysis, 
landed on a handful of authors’ approaches which I believe works well in my research. Hajer 
(1995), Jensen (2015), Neumann (2008) and Gee (2011) set out to create an analytical tool to 
be further applied in research. Hence, by relying on their extensive research and various 
approaches, I have attempted to draw out the most applicable tools for my own study in order 
to guide me through what sometimes can come across as a diffuse and unconventional 
research method.  
 
2.3 Discourse as an analytical tool  
There are several ways to begin the process of discourse analysis, thus, knowing what an 
analytical ‘tool’ is serves as a good beginning. A ‘tool’, in the sense of Gee (2011), is the 
questions you ask of the data at hand. Moreover, every question makes the researcher look at 
the details in the sentence more closely, as well as linking it to meanings and intent that the 
writer(s) have had when putting the policy down on paper (Gee, 2011). Furthermore, 
according to Neumann (2008), it helps to draw on ‘extant knowledge’ when conducting a 
discourse analysis, both in terms of choosing the topic and saving time when trying to 
understand the subject at hand. With a background in Political Science, Russian Studies, and 
International Environmental Studies, choosing the High North as the focal point of my studies 
was not a coincident. To draw on my ‘cultural competence,’ my hopes are to combine my 
academic knowledge and personal interest to draw out the underlying meanings and 
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representation in the Norwegian High North policy making by using discourse analysis 
(Neumann, 2008).   
Hajer (1995) proposes the following analytical course when applying discourse analysis to 
a policy process. First, an important step in the analytical process is to understand the 
‘regularities and variation’ in what is being said and/or written. Second, there needs to be an 
underlying understanding of the social backgrounds and effects that constitutes the different 
discourses. Third, it is important to be aware of the contextual situation in which a statement 
is made and to whom the statement is directed, when conducting the analysis. Fourth, pointing 
out the content of what is being said is an expressive way of showing the reader the 
foundation for the arguments. Jensen (2015) outlines this method – called the ‘sandwich 
method’- where one should first tell the reader about the content, then show the reader by 
inserting the appropriate quotes and further elaborate on the content of the quotes. Moreover, 
an interesting question arises when considering how all the different actors who are involved 
in the discursive process of formulating a policy, reaches a consensus. Politics concerns itself 
with the contestation of many different opinions, and it becomes the analysts’ job to point out 
the different opinions and carriers of these opinions (Neumann, 2008). One position tends to 
be the dominant (normally, how it had always been), while one or two other positions might 
try to challenge this position (Neumann, 2008). This is highly relevant in terms of the often 
contradictory discursion around the future development path of the Arctic where you have a 
clear policy line towards continuing present resource exploration, while the environmental - 
as well as indigenous concerns - might try and contest the hegemonic view.  
 
2.3.1 A ‘toolkit’ for discourse analysis.  
In order to point out the representations that are interesting and important to a 
discourse analysis, some tools for analysis are vital. The following analytical tools were 
contrived from the literature and will assist me in the process of analysing the Norwegian 
policy papers for the High North. First, Neumann (2008) outlines metaphors as a tool for 
showing the readers the repeated representations in a text. “The ideal is to include as many 
representations and their variations as possible, and to specify where they are to be found in as 
high degree as possible” (Neumann, 2008, p. 62). Representations, in its simplicity, are how 
we interpret phenomena or stories of how something has always been, in the way it is 
presented (Grindheim, 2009). In the High North policies I will look for the representations of 
petroleum and environmental policies, to see how the petroleum discourse is made up of 
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certain ‘truths’ that is reproduced from one policy statement to the next. Neumann (2008) 
points out that there is generally one dominating representation, and few alternative or 
possibly contesting representations. In the Norwegian High North policy, the main 
representation is one of Norway as a petroleum nation. The contesting and sometimes 
opposing representations are that Norway is an environmental state, and a ‘steward’ of the 
Arctic. Neumann (2008) He furthermore concludes that “[d]iscourse analysis therefore is 
particularly well suited for studying situations where power is maintained by aid of culture 
and challenged only to a limited degree, that is, what Gramscians call ‘hegemony’”. (p. 70) 
 Additionally, Hajer (1995) develops the role of metaphors in the text when 
introducing the concepts of ‘story-lines’. This is a good tool when looking for ‘simplified 
presentations’ of problems and issues that are, in reality, much more complex (Grindheim, 
2009). Story-lines, according to Hajer (1995) are: 
 
(…) condensed narratives or discourses containing simplified messages supported by 
metaphors with as much emotional as intellectual appeal. (…) a generative sort of 
narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give 
meanings to specific physical or social phenomena. Key function of a story line is that 
they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of 
a problem like acid rain” (p. 56). 
Another tool in the discourse toolkit is the concept of ‘buzzwords and fuzzwords’, which 
Cornwall (2010) explains in the following way:  
Policies depend on a measure of ambiguity to secure the endorsement of diverse 
potential actors and audiences. Buzzwords aid this process, by providing concepts that 
can ﬂoat free of concrete referents, to be ﬁlled with meaning by their users. In the 
struggles for interpretive power that characterise the negotiation of the language of 
policy, buzzwords shelter multiple agendas, providing room for manoeuvre and space 
for contestation. (p. 5) 
Although not extensively used in the following analysis of the High North policies, I identify 
the ‘environment’ as a ‘buzzword’ in the analysis, as the word is frequently used both in the 
pro-petroleum discourse, in addition to the anti-petroleum discourse. It is a word that can be 
attributed to almost any situation in the High North, and creates enough ambiguity and room 
for manoeuvring that it works in whatever way the policy-maker intends it to.  
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 Finally, a study of interdiscursivity can allow us to unveil how certain discourses are 
reproduced by using old representations and connections in a ‘new’ way. It serves as a tool to 
seek out change and connections, where we can see a discourse taking parts from previously 
established discourses and linking them to new themes. In the High North policy, we see that 
the pro-drilling discourse has borrowed representations from the anti-drilling discourse of an 
un-environmental Russia, and used this representation as an explanation for why Norway 
should carry out resource exploration is vulnerable Arctic areas. Consequently, 
interdiscursivity is a way for actors to put forward their arguments and representations as the 
hegemonic discourse (Grindheim, 2009).  
 
2.3.2 What will I analyse? 
The vital step in conducting a discourse analysis is to delimit the right texts to analyse. In 
my case, the texts chosen are national policy papers, also named ‘monuments’ (Neumann, 
2008). Discourse analysis gives epistemological and methodological priority to the study of 
primary texts, like presidential statements and official policy documents (Hansen, 2006). In 
order to be identified as a primary text, there are three preconditions that have to be fulfilled. 
First, the texts should clearly articulate identities and policies. Second, they should be widely 
read and in wide publication. Third, they should have formal authority to define a political 
position (Hansen, 2006). According to Hajer (1995), “analysing policy papers becomes 
important even if they do not include “hard” new proposals or legislation. It becomes 
imperative to examine the specific idea of reality or of the status quo as something that is 
upheld by key actors through discourse”. (p. 55)  
The texts analysed in this thesis are primarily governmental policy papers on the High 
North published in the five-year period from 2009-2014, which fulfils the three mentioned 
criteria and would therefore fall in the category of primary texts. The reason for choosing this 
period stems from trying to differentiate my research from the growing body of research done 
on this topic. Although I use similar analytical and theoretical tools that have been previously 
applied, the more recent policy papers and official documents on the High North have yet to 
be analysed in other studies. I will build on the previous studies done to show similarities or 
differences, and introduce new observations for the more recent policy papers.  In addition, 
the analysis will also include selected ministerial speeches from the same period. 
The main texts that form the basis of my analysis were all published by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The first policy paper is the second part of the Government’s High North 
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strategy, called New Building Blocks in the North. The Next Step in the Government’s High 
North Strategy, published in 2009. This paper is 92 pages long, and contains sections on the 
environment, the development of the petroleum industry and security issues, among others. 
Strategies does not lead to legal jurisdiction, however, they set the agenda and outline 
priorities for further state-action in a given area (Grindheim, 2009). The strategy paper is 
translated into English, and it is this version that I have analysed in order to not loose 
metaphors and representations in translation. The next policy paper is a White paper, called 
High North. Visions and Strategies, published in 2012, also in English. This White paper is 
141 pages and divided in three sections. Part I, Strategic objectives and policy instruments. 
Part II – A responsible actor in the High North, and Part III – Growing activity in the High 
North. Opportunities and challenges. White papers serve as a way for the Government to 
present their discussions around future policies to the Parliament (Storting). These 
publications are made by the Ministries, and they act as guides to what the Parliament should 
consider in any final resolutions (Regjeringen, 2008).  
The third paper is a report, published by the new Government in 2014, called Norway’s 
arctic policy. Creating value, managing resources, confronting climate change and fostering 
knowledge. Developments in the Arctic concern us all6. The report is 71 pages, but stands out 
from the two prior policy-papers. It is published more as a brochure with large pictures, 
condensed texts in often interview form, with facts, figures and tables highlighted throughout 
the paper. It appears to be designed for a broad audience, and serves the information in an 
easily accessible and innovative way. All three papers were read from cover to cover, in a 
chronological way, starting with the oldest. Additionally, I have also used earlier White 
papers and policy statements to underline and highlight historical arguments and discourses 
where appropriate.  
 
Primary texts set the agenda and shape the issues at hand, and they frame and produce 
representations of foreign policy. The actors, empowered by their roles as institutions 
or presidents, have certain authority and power to define how reality should be 
perceived. (Jensen, 2012, pp. 44-45) 
 
                                                 
6 I have used both the Norwegian and English version of this Report (I have explained the reasoning in section 
2.3.2.) The Norwegian version will be referred to as (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a) and the English version 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b)  
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2.3.3 Critiques/problems of using discourse analysis as a methodology 
One of the prevalent critiques of using discourse analysis as a research method is that it is 
 a ‘subjective and interpretive’ method (Grindheim, 2009), that is in danger of becoming the 
author’s own personal opinions or verifying the researcher’s preconceived notions that leads 
to a study of “doubtful scientific value” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 234). In my analysis, I use the 
‘sandwich method’ to build my arguments, where I make a statement and show it by selecting 
the appropriate quotes from the policy-papers. Although this method contributes to highlight 
the arguments, I still run the risk of making erroneous links and connections when I remove 
the quotes from the overall contexts. Furthermore, selecting the more extreme quotes might 
also give a wrong representation of the discourse, and it is therefore vital that the author’s 
steps and thought process are explained clearly, and the quotes referred to properly, so that 
others can go back and check the sources in order to verify the analysis (Grindheim, 2009).  
A further critique against using discourse analysis in addition to other social science 
methods is the problem of generalization that is so predominant in natural science studies. 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006), this constant ‘battle’ between the quantitative and qualitative 
choice of research method is misleading in the overall debate about what is good research. He 
concludes that: “[g]ood social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the 
sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help answer the 
research questions at hand” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 242). I am not claiming that my research can 
make any generalizations about Norwegian policy making that constitutes a ‘reality’ or 
enables a predictive theorization about how the general policy-making processes functions. 
Nevertheless, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that generalization is often overrated “as the main 
source of scientific progress”, and that the “force of example” is often underrated (p, 226, 
228).  As Jensen (2015) notes in his deduction of using discourse analysis as a beneficial 
methodology that contributes to scientific knowledge accumulation: “[t]he researcher must 
work with what has been written down or verbalized in some form or another in order to 
establish patterns in the statements, as well as the likely social impact of different discursive 
representations of reality” (n.p.). This has been my attempt in this empirical study of 
Norwegian petroleum and environmental discourse in the High North. The Norwegian 
Government’s policy-making processes and outcomes have grown as an interest of study for 
many scholars, with discourse analysis as the main choice of methodological approach. With 
my contribution, I am not hoping to make a grand discovery or see something that no one else 
has ever seen. Rather, I am attempting to contribute to the general knowledge accumulation of 
18 
 
the High North policy-making, and as Flyvbjerg (2006) notes, “[t]hat knowledge cannot be 
formally generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of 
knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society” (p. 227). 
Lastly, a problem of translation appeared when analysing the policy paper from 2014 on 
the High North from the new Government. I have primarily used the English version when 
conducting the discourse analysis, just to avoid a possible translation error. What I did not 
first consider is that some meanings might already have been altered in the official translation. 
However, this issue arose when I looked at the difference between the Norwegian and English 
version of the Report Norway’s Arctic policy (Nordkloden) (2014). Consequently, I started 
out analysing the Norwegian version of this text, as I could not find an English translation. It 
was in this version that I discovered what I have later described as an ‘intensification’ of the 
High North petroleum discourse. Here, the Norwegian Government was making it clear that 
they intent to “go from word to action” in addition to conduct an “offensive [here meaning 
aggressive] petroleum policy” in the High North (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, p. 3 and 
p. 28). However, when I finally discovered the English version of the Report and decided to 
go back and use the official English translation of the quotes in order to complete a unified 
approach to my analysis, I realised that the officially translated quotes did not portray the 
same ‘intensification’ of the petroleum discourse as my own interpretation of the Norwegian 
version. The quote “[w]e will go from word to action…”(p. 3) was officially translated “[w]e 
intend to work hard…”(p.3). The official translation of the Government carrying out an 
“offensive petroleum policy…”(p.28), became to carry out “an ambitious oil and gas 
policy…”(p.20). This revelation left me a little perplexed, and I decided to go back and check 
all the translations of all the quotes I have used. Although I have not discovered the same 
discrepancy between the Norwegian and English versions of the two other policy papers, it 
has highlighted an interesting and somewhat puzzling situation, which I am unsure of what 
really means. I have discussed this further in the Analysis in Chapter 4. As a possible reason 
to the alteration, the English version of the 2014 Report states the following: “[p]lease note: 
This English version of the report is an extract and updated version of the Norwegian report 
«Nordkloden», that was launched in November 2014.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, 
p.3) Due to this declaration, I have continued to look at both versions of this report and 
explained the possible conflicting statements if they occur. When I have not made a note, the 
translations are in unison from the English versions of all three policy papers and, in my 
interpretations, do not convey a different meaning than from the original Norwegian version.  
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2.4 Different theories of discourse 
2.4.1 Environmental Discourse  
This thesis will look at the Norwegian energy agenda in the High North from an 
environmental viewpoint. There is a clear paradox in Norwegian foreign policy between the 
heightened focus on fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic on the one hand, and the focus of 
protecting the fragile Arctic environment on the other hand. It therefore becomes relevant to 
look not merely at discourse analysis, but go further and include theory behind environmental 
discourse as presented in Hajer (1995). According to Hajer (1995), environmental discourse is 
time and space specific, being determined by a particular perception of nature, which is a 
symptom of our “past experiences and present preoccupations” (p. 17). Using discourse 
analysis to analyse environmental problems is consequently about understanding why certain 
environmental problems come further up on the political agenda than others (Hajer, 1995). 
Environmental discourse is a social constructivist approach to the discursive orientation to 
how environmental politics is made. Five points are made by Hajer (1995, pp. 17-18) to 
underline this approach. 
First, we are not in an environmental crisis, rather an ‘environmental dilemma’; a result of 
industrialisation, as humans have always manipulated and used the environment for their 
benefit. Hence, we analyse socio-ecological problems rather than simply ecological problems. 
Second, “[e]nvironmental change is of all times and all societies but the meaning we give to 
physical phenomena is dependent on our specific cultural preoccupations” (Hajer, 1995, p. 
18). Looking at the environmental focus in the policy papers on a five-year time scale might 
underline this point further. Third, people have through history had a very contradicting view 
on nature, where we on the one hand want to control, cultivate and use nature, while one the 
other hand we long for the wild and undisturbed nature that we want to conserve and protect 
(Thomas, 1893, as in Hajer 1995).  
 
(…) how to reconcile the physical requirements of civilization with the new feeling and 
values which the same civilization had generated. (…) the growth of towns had led to a 
new longing for the countryside. The progress of cultivation had fostered a taste for 
weeds, mountains and unsubdued nature. The new-found security from wild animals had 
generated an increasing concern to protect birds and preserve wild creatures in their 
natural state. (Thomas, 1893, p. 301, as sited in Hajer, 1995, p. 19)  
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Keith Tomas wrote on attitudes of the British people on nature between 1500-1800, 
but the same argument can be applied today. It is evident from the Norwegian policy papers 
on the High North that the core of the debate is just this contradicting notion of the social 
development that we envision for the Arctic. The undisturbed nature and the wild animals that 
we want to preserve and protect, stand in stark contradiction to the industrial development and 
resource exploitation that we want to base our future economy on. The inability to deal with 
this contradiction within ourselves and in our developing societies has led us to a critical 
point, and perhaps the most serious environmental dilemma ever to face humankind. 
Fourth, environmental problems are usually not discussed in its full complexity, leaving 
room for the formation of environmental metaphors/metonyms, which are issues that people 
understand as the ‘larger hole’ as the environmental problem (Hajer, 1995). Where political 
analysis comes in here is to identify these metonyms, how they arose and evaluate the effect 
of this kind of ‘coalition formation’ in the environmental discourse. The natural example for 
the Arctic in this regard is how the ‘melting of the Arctic’ has become a metonym for the 
environmental problem that is most detrimental in the North. Moreover, we see the process of 
how the melting of the Arctic opens up the area for further resource exploration, as well as a 
shift in the ice edge, including larger areas for exploration.  
Fifth, environmental issues only become political when they are discursively created. 
“Calamities only become a political issue if they are constituted as such in environmental 
discourse, if story-lines are created around them that indicate the significance of the physical 
events” (Hajer, 1995, pp. 20-21). The solitary polar bear is an image of the melting ice and the 
consequences of such an event, but what about the numerous other consequences of an ice-
melt? Alternatively, oil spills gain focus when there has been a huge one, affecting local 
communities or animals. However, there are many real and consequential oils spills every 
day, but this is not sensationalized in the media and also stays away from the political agenda. 
In the forthcoming analysis, I will further discuss the main environmental discourse and the 
prevailing representations and story-lines that makes these issues politicized. Consequently, 
as Jensen (2010) has pointed out, the environmental discourse has even been adapted by the 
petroleum discourse, to form ‘co-optation’ of certain representations, bringing in the 
environmental discourse to defend the continuance of Norwegian resource exploration in the 
High North.  
Although my analysis gives precedence to the petroleum discourse in the Norwegian High 
North policy formation, it is unveiled that the petroleum discourse and the environmental 
discourse are both intertwined (co-optation) and detached, in the sense that they exist side by 
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side in the general High North discourse, increasingly in tension, although presented as two 
separate strands of policy. This underlies the paradox of the Norwegian High North politics, 
and I develop this further in the forthcoming chapters.  
 
2.4.2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
As I work on detangling the petroleum and environmental discourse in the Norwegian 
High North policy papers, a notion of power and a hegemonic voice becomes apparent. In 
order to conceptualize these thoughts, I turn towards Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), with 
its focus on power and the reproduction of unequal power relations. Fairclough and Wodak 
(1997) outlines the main theoretical foundation of CDA in the following structured way: 
CDA sees discourse – language used in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. 
Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which 
frame it: The discourse event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse 
is socially constructive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of 
knowledge, and the social identities of relationships between people and groups of people. 
It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status 
quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially 
consequential, it gives rise to the important issues of power. Discursive practices may 
have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal 
power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural 
majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and - position 
people. (p. 257) 
In its most basic form, this thesis is about how one discourse gains power over another to 
form policy in an area that is highly contested and sought after at the same time. I am a voter, 
and I elect my leaders based on the available knowledge out there. Therefore, it is vital that 
the underlying discourse, opinions, political ideologies, personal interests and so on, are 
sufficiently and critically studied in order to have the best available knowledge to base our 
decisions on. Wodak and Mayer (2009, p. 7) explains CDA in the following way: 
Critical theories, thus also CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that 
enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-
reflection. Thus, they are aimed at producing ‘enlightenment and emancipation’. Such 
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theories seek out not only to describe and explain, but also to root out a particular kind of 
delusion. Even with differing concepts of ideology, critical theory seeks to create 
awareness in agents of their own needs and interests. (p. 7) 
Norway has for a long time been driven by a deterministic and hegemonic petroleum 
policy; our economy is based on the continuing development of resource exploration, and we 
all live well on the fruits of its profits. Siv Jensen, the Norwegian Minister of Finance, said 
recently at a party meeting that the world’s energy need will be bigger in 25 years than it is 
today, and that fossil fuels will be the main source of energy (Mogen, 2015). She furthermore 
claims, “the world needs every single drop of oil that Norway can explore7.” Although she 
was speaking as a party leader, she also has the legitimization of being the nations Finance 
Minister, a place of significant power in Norway. She speaks about the petroleum industry in 
an undisputed way, that it is a fact that the ‘world needs every drop of Norwegian fossil fuel.’ 
Critical voices will argue that indeed the world does not need every drop of Norwegian 
petroleum, as 2/3 of all fossil fuel reserves will need to remain underground if we are to meet 
the 2-degree goal (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). It is these repeated hegemonic representations of 
undisputed facts in Norwegian petroleum discourse that first enticed me to conduct a 
discourse analysis of the High North policies. According to Wodak and Meyer (2009), “ 
[t]ypically, CDA researchers are interested in the way discourse (re)produce social 
domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over the others, and how dominated groups 
may discursively resist such abuse”(p. 9). “Consequently, it is not the individual resources 
and not the specifics of single-exchange situations that are crucial for CDA analyses, but the 
overall structural features in social fields or in overall society” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 
10).  
 With this discourse analysis of the High North policies, I wish to highlight and argue 
that there are certain representations that take the seat at the head of the table, while others get 
pushed towards the end and remain in the periphery of the policy-making. The Minister of 
Finance is not the only one who proclaims that the ‘world needs’ Norwegian energy, as will 
be further discussed in the analysis. It is not the representation of one person in power that 
forms the main discourse. It is rather the reproduced representations and story-lines over a 
longer time-period that serves as the basis for discourse analysis. Furthermore, CDA 
                                                 
7 «Verden trenger hver eneste dråpe olje Norge råder over» in 
http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/08/10/nyheter/innenriks/frp/siv_jensen/olje/40555341/ 
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highlights that the texts, which forms the basis for power, are not the work of a single person 
or even a single government institution.  
 
An important perspective in CDA related to the notion of ‘power’ is that it is very rare that 
a text is the work of only one person. In texts, discursive differences are negotiated; they 
are governed by differences in power that is in part encoded in and determined by 
discourse and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that they bear traces 
of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance. (Wodak 
& Meyer, 2009, p. 10)   
In the High North policy papers, the struggle between petroleum exploration on the one 
hand, and environmental concerns on the other, is visible. Although, at the same time there is 
also a notion that these two strands of policies can carry on side by side without really 
affecting each other.  
CDA plays on the notion of power and how power is formed as a result of negotiations 
and relations between several actors. As this thesis focuses on the Norwegian state as the 
overall actor of management of the Arctic environment, albeit divided between several 
ministries, agendas and institutions, one should look at a further theoretical view of the state 
in environmental governance. The next chapter will continue to develop the theoretical 
assumptions that the analysis is built on. I do not follow one theoretical approach throughout 
the analysis; rather I have selected different theories that make up a wider theoretical 
approach to the content at hand. This includes a theoretical view of the role of the state in 
resource management as progressive and innovative in changing the ecological space (Barry 
& Eckersley, 2005); how institutions are formed and developed through institutional bricolage 
(Cleaver, 2012); that Arctic security concerns can be viewed thought the lens of a post-
structuralist approach to securitization theory (Hansen, 2011; Jensen, 2015), which not only 
widens the security agenda, but also deepens it; and finally, the inclusion of the ‘human 
security’ concept to add an individualistic view of the security actor and to step away from the 
state-centric approach to security (Hoogensen et al. 2009; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). 
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3.0 Theoretical assumptions 
In this chapter, I will outline my underlying theoretical perspectives for the thesis. In 
the previous chapter I explained that discourse analysis is not simply a set of methods, but 
also carries with it epistemological premises that derives and recreates meanings and 
interpretations; for instance, policies. That is meaningful in relation to uncovering the 
assumptions, narratives and representations that form the foundation of the High North 
discourse analysed in this thesis. Furthermore, it is valuable to outline the thesis’ theoretical 
assumptions regarding the role of the State as an important actor in the management of the 
environment in a highly globalized and resource dependent world. The second part of this 
chapter draws critically on the Copenhagen School of securitization as a theoretical 
framework, with a focus on the discursively constructed speech act. It thus adopts a post-
structuralist approach in order to not just ‘widen’ the security concept’ but also to ‘deepen’ it 
in response to some of its main criticism. Finally, the chapter ends by drawing on the concept 
of ‘human security’ in order to include further aspects of Arctic security into the analysis and 
highlight the diverse role and meaning of those responsible for uttering the speech act, 
including a wider view of who should be considered the ‘actor’ in security theory.  
3.1 The role of the state in environmental governance in the Arctic  
 The first part of the analysis in this thesis considers the discourse of petroleum and 
environmental policies in the Norwegian High North policy papers. This is done to uncover 
the overarching representations and story-lines that the Government uses to conduct its High 
North policies. From an environmental view, the role of the state in environmental 
governance is at best ambivalent, as the government both facilitates policies that enables 
environmental destruction and environmental protection. Whitehead, Jones and Jones (2006) 
point to an evolving and somewhat anarchistic literature that highlights the increasing “spatial 
divide between the political and domestic spaces of the state and ecological places of nature”. 
(p. 51) In recent times, the compounding force of globalization, both in terms of supressing 
state sovereignty in economic matters, but also contributing to the increase of trans-national 
pollution and global climate change, has added weight to the anarchistic view of a state-nature 
relations that is at its “best anachronistic and at worst irrelevant” (Whitehead, Jones & Jones, 
2006, p. 51). Nevertheless, as opposed to radical political ecology, there are voices arguing 
that the state has been transformed; it did not become insignificant, but grew into an important 
and progressive part in changing social and ecological space (Barry & Eckersley, 2005). 
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Barry and Eckersley accept some of the reasons for eco-anarchistic pessimism of the state’s 
ability to protect the ecological space. Their approach, however, is one of careful optimism 
regarding the role of the state as an ever changing and progressive player that at times shows 
potential of ‘engagement and renewal’. In this view, the state is not a static body; rather it is 
composed of a variety of changing practices, discourses, social relations and policies, which 
are interconnected on many different levels (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010). However, this 
fluidity can produce a fragmented way of forming institutions, priorities and practices, which 
can create tension rather than balance. A question to consider further in the analysis of this 
thesis is how the discourse around energy and the environment has been incorporated 
irregularly in the state policies of the Norwegian government, which produces tension rather 
than balance and as well as often holding contrasting political views.  
 Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes the policy papers on the High 
North, they are a product of a wider collaboration between several Ministries, among them the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Ministry of Climate and Environment. These 
institutions have separate agendas that often stand in contrast to each other. To be aware of 
the many voices and agendas is important when analysing the High North policy papers, since 
access to natural resources opens up different questions and interests fields for the different 
institutions. Frances Cleaver (2012) looks at this discrepancy of formation and development 
of institutions in resource management, stating that: 
Access to resources may be mediated by a range of institutions. These include 
designed arrangements of varying degree of openness and formality (committees, 
associations, user groups, burial societies), institutionalised interactions as embodied 
in kinship and social networks, relations of reciprocity and patronage and in sets of 
norms and practices deeply embedded in the habits and routines of everyday life. (p. 
14) 
In addition to laying out the theoretical assumptions of the state in environmental 
governance and the formation of institutions in resource management, the next section will 
outline the theoretical framework for analysing the widening security approach in the High 
North and the role of human security in the Arctic.  
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3.2 Security theory 
3.2.1 Going beyond the traditionalist approach to security 
During the Cold War there was a wide usage of the ‘traditional’ or ‘narrow’ definition 
of security in international relations8 as something that was bound to a military concern with 
the state as the main player. “Security is a concept about power, as well as a powerful 
concept” (Hoogensen & Goloviznina, 2014, p. 1). Maintaining this close relationship between 
the state, power and security reinforces a world-view built on an imagery that the state is the 
only important actor and enforcer capable of providing security through its military. Ullmann 
(1983) points out that while politicians have found it difficult to rally electorates around non-
military security issues, analysts have also found it difficult to create a comprehensive 
analytical framework where threats are measures against the relative contribution towards 
national security in order to create an appropriate response. After the end of the Cold War, 
there was nevertheless an increasing interest in moving away from a narrow definition to 
create a more comprehensive security framework. An emerging group of scholars began to 
voice their discontent around the neo-realist basis for forming security theory. Their argument 
revolved around the different challenges and realities in the post-Cold War era, which made it 
necessary to introduce a new security approach to address contemporary issues (Krause & 
Williams, 1996). The debate was centred on moving away from the neorealist 
conceptualization of security as ‘state security’, where a threat was responded to by ‘military 
force’, in an anarchistic world controlled by the ‘security dilemma’ (Krause and Williams, 
1996).  One of the earliest attempts to redefine the narrow neo-realist approach to security 
came from Richard H. Ullmann (1983) as he proposes a rather unconventional definition of 
security: 
 
(…) a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens 
drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the 
inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy 
choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities 
(persons, groups, corporations) within the state. (p. 133) 
  
                                                 
8 In accordance with Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), it is important to include security in ‘international 
relations’, as oppose to merely security used in everyday language, as the context of the two types of security 
differs immensely.  
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Ullmann’s new definition of security includes natural disasters and environmental 
problems as a part of the security agenda, in addition to more traditional security concerns of 
wars and rebellions. In his view, limiting the definition of national security to simply military 
terms creates a false and potentially dangerous reality, which takes away focus on other (and 
perhaps more serious) dangers, as well as contributes to extensive militarization of the world, 
leading to global insecurity in the long run (Ullmann, 1983). Furthermore, Thomas Homer-
Dixon (1991; 1994) proposed a research agenda that analyses how environmental degradation 
and scarcities can contribute to create ‘acute national and international conflict.’ He finds that 
there are clear indications between environmental degradation and the possibility of conflict. 
In accordance with anti-Malthusians, he highlights that there are no clear causal or direct links 
but rather numerous intervening factors - including technological, physical, social and 
economic, which results in humans experiencing these changes with great variance, levels of 
resilience and adaptability (Homer-Dixon, 1991).  
 
3.2.2 The beginning of securitization 
As previously discussed, the post-Cold War era required scholars to ‘deepen’ or 
‘widen’ the neorealist security approach in order to fit a different security reality. As the Cold 
War had contributed to a security reality driven by a ‘nuclear and military obsession,’ the 
emergence of new economic, social and political issues drove the need to widen this narrow 
approach (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998).  The Copenhagen School of Securitization 
emerged in the wake of this. Although new concepts were in demand around why and what 
needs securing, what are the threats and by what means can these threats be secured, it did not 
entail a direct move away from the neorealist approach. Rather, the emerging Copenhagen 
School had a ‘critical and constructivist’ approach to security,’ where national security was 
looked upon as “a particular set of discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally 
shared understandings” (Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 243).  According to Waever (1995), 
securitization theory is built on a study of the processes that allows threats to be represented 
politically, or in other words: "who can 'do' or 'speak' security successfully, on what issues, 
under what conditions, and with what effects…[w]hat is essential is the designation of an 
existential threat…and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience." (p. 4) 
 
The Copenhagen School ‘widens’ the security framework by including non-military 
security issues such as economic security, societal security, political security and 
environmental security. In order to create a framework, they first construct a 
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‘conceptualization of security’, which aims to specify the concept insomuch as it means 
something more than ‘just a threat or a problem’, as they hereby explain: 
Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, 
but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that 
distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged 
as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates 
endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. (Buzan, 
Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 5) 
 “Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and 
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus 
be seen as a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 23). 
According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), the way to study the process of 
‘securitization’ is through the study of discourse and political constellations. The challenge is 
to find out when an argument with a certain kind of rhetoric and ‘semiotic structure’ becomes 
so entrenched in the general discourse that the public will accept that rules which otherwise 
have been obeyed, will be overruled by the actor in power. In this thesis, I will not necessarily 
look for things outside the ‘narrow’ security concept to identify processes of securitization. 
Rather, I will point out discourse around subjects that Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) 
refer to as a ‘securitizing move’, meaning that the public might not have accepted the concept 
as something that is an ‘existential threat’ to something else, which requires violations of 
established rules. As it would be an extensive task and going beyond the means of this thesis 
to also look at the public acceptance of the High North policy, I believe that there is still value 
in identifying certain areas and concepts which might be called ‘securitizing moves’. This will 
highlight possible trends towards what can become fully securitized further down the line.  
3.2.3. Limitations to securitization theory: a post-structuralist approach  
Although the central thoughts from the Copenhagen School of securitization is applied 
in the scope of this essay to address and outline the widening of Arctic security issues, there 
are limitations to using this theoretical framework in analysis, as pointed out by several 
critical voices. In the recent literature, critiques of the Securitization theory have included, but 
not been limited to Hansen (2001, 2011), Balsacq (2005), McDonald (2008), Huysmans 
(2011) and Stritzel (2007, 2011). Hansen (2001) argues that there are limitations in the use of 
‘speech act’ as a defining characteristic of how a security issue can be set on the agenda. She 
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takes gender as an example, and points out two ‘blank spots’ in defining the ‘speech act,’ 
including ‘security as silence,’ where speaking up can evoke further security concerns or it is 
merely impossible, and ‘subsuming security,’ where, for instance, the gender identity is 
undermined by other identities such as national or religious identity (Hansen, 2001).  
McDonald (2008) furthermore comments on the narrow definition of the ‘speech act,’ as it 
limits other forms of communication (for instance, images or material practices). He 
moreover highlights the potential restrictive nature of the ‘speech act’ as carried out by those 
named ‘institutionally legitimate,’ excluding other potentially important voices from speaking 
on behalf of the state. Also, the theory does not adequately address the possibility that a 
security act can develop over time, by several overlapping processes and representations, in 
addition to questions regarding why certain representations develop into security issues while 
others do not. Finally, he points out the narrowness of the securitization framework as 
defining the act merely as a threat to security, which renders the conceptualization of security 
politics ‘as inherently negative or reactionary’ (McDonald, 2008).  
Yet another critique of the Copenhagen School has come from Morten Kelstrup 
(2004), where he furthers the need for inclusion of the role of globalization in creating 
underlying conditions that changes the traditional approach to security, which the 
Copenhagen school has not adequately addressed in their securitization theory: 
The general picture is that the different forms of globalisation create a move from a 
world in which military concerns dominate questions of security to a world in which 
societal insecurity plays a much greater role, not in the sense that military means are 
unimportant, but rather in the sense that new complexities of societal insecurity 
becomes the primary security concern. (Kelstrup, 2004, p. 110)  
This is in line with Mark Duffield’s (2001) view that in a world of new forms of war, a 
security and development merge: “[i]n response to the new wars and the merging of 
development and security, innovative strategic complexes – linking state and non-state actors. 
Public and private organisations, military and civilian organisations and so on – have 
emerged” (Duffield, 2001, p. 45). These ‘innovative strategic complexes’ entail a new 
governance system, created partly as a response to the way globalization leads to societal 
insecurities.  
Developed on the critiques and limitations of the Copenhagen School, a new approach 
evolves, based on post-structuralism. Post-structuralism is understood as “a critical attitude, 
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approach or ethos, which calls attention to the importance of representations, the relationship 
of power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in the production and understanding of 
global affairs” (Campbell, 2007, p. 206). Hansen (2011) proposes, based on the securitization 
theory, a post-structuralist framework constructed on three questions:  
Through which discursive structures are cases and phenomena represented and 
incorporated into a larger discursive field? What is the epistemic terrain through which 
phenomena is known? And, what are the substantial modalities that define what kind 
of an issue a security problem is? (p. 357) 
This attempt to expand the securitization theory therefor acts as the foundation of the 
theoretical framework that supports the analysis of the widening and deepening of the Arctic 
security concept. Nevertheless, there is an alternative theory worth introducing to this 
theoretical discussion of widening of the Arctic security concept, namely the concept of 
‘human security.’ Although human security does not necessarily following the same 
theoretical foundations as the Copenhagen School, securitization theory does open up for the 
inclusion of non-state actors in setting the security agenda, making human security a possible 
platform for introducing a more diverse range of ‘speech actors’ (Hoogensen Gjørv, 20149). 
The next section will briefly outline the human security approach, and discuss how it can 
work in tandem, rather than be an opposing theory to the Copenhagen School of 
securitization. The important overall questions to ask, regardless of the specific theoretical 
framework chosen for the analysis, is by ‘whom, in what context and for what political 
purpose’ a security threat is being invoked (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010; Buzan, Wæver & 
de Wilde, 1998; Hoogensen et al., 2009).  
3.2.4. Human Security   
Human security in its most basic form means ‘freedom from fear, freedom from want’, 
as defined in the United Nations Human Development Report (1994). I was first introduced to 
the concept of ‘human security’ in a lecture by Professor Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv at the 
Arctic Frontiers conference this past January when forming ideas around my thesis. She 
introduced the assumption that security does not merely mean military security orchestrated 
by the state, but it includes individual security of what we hold dear and what is going to 
                                                 
9 Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv has changed her last name between 2009 and 2014. In 2009, her last name was 
only Hoogensen, now Hoogensen Gjørv. Not to confuse, I have referenced her throughout the thesis as 
Hoogensen Gjørv (2014) or Hoogensen (2009).  
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make us feel secure in the future. For the future of the Arctic and the people living there, 
individual security might entail development of fossil fuel production in order to experience 
economic stability and security. While for other people, protecting the environment and 
focusing on renewable energy development in the region is a part of ensuring their individual 
security for the future. In accordance with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), security also includes dimensions such as economic, food, health, environmental, 
personal, community and political security. These concerns were included to try to rectify the 
glaring gap between the traditional narrow approaches to security in the Cold War era formed 
by superpowers, to the emerging reality of individual security concerns in fragile, newly 
formed nations (UNDP, 1994). Updating the UNDP approach to human security, Hoogensen 
et al. (2009) add a definition of human security that applies to the Arctic and other 
communities today: 
Security is achieved when individuals and/or multiple actors have the freedom to 
identify risks and threats to their wellbeing and values (negative security), the 
opportunity to articulate these threats to other actors, and the capacity to determine 
ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats either individually or in 
concert with other actors (positive security). (p. 3) 
By ‘actors’ in this definition of security, Hoogensen et al. (2009) includes ‘individuals and 
communities, researchers and research communities, governmental organisations and non-
governmental organisations, media, business/industry, military and policy makers’, which all 
play a role in identifying threats and ensuring security. Although the main theoretical 
framework in this thesis is based on the post-structuralist approach to securitization theory, I 
find it valuable to include the human security concept. In the following discourse analysis of 
the Foreign Ministry’s High North policy papers, it is the state that is the main actor setting 
the security agenda in the High North. Nevertheless, as Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv pointed out 
at the Arctic Frontiers conference, analysing the Arctic security discourse is about finding 
who is in and who is out of the security discourse, and as will be shown in the discourse 
analysis, the state does not act as a static and isolated actor. Rather, there are concerns being 
raised from organizations, businesses, communities and research clusters among others, which 
play a role in forming the policy. At any given time, there are those who are present at the 
table, affecting the direction of the discourse and agenda setting, while many more are 
excluded. Thus, it is important to be aware of who is in and who is out of the High North 
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discourse to uncover trends and formation of certain representations and discourse, as it will 
also play a key role in the future formation of the High North security agenda.  
3.2.5 How discourse analysis and theory is combined in the analysis. 
 In the previous chapter, I stated that discourse in this thesis is interpreted as going 
beyond the written word to look at meanings and representations in a limited, but grouped 
arrangement of texts to critically engage with the official High North discourse in Norwegian 
politics. The individual texts do not provide a deeper meaning in themselves, however, they 
become meaningful when they are connected with other texts, as one can then draw on 
repeated representations to uncover how texts are produced, distributed and accepted (Jensen, 
2012). My approach to using discourse analysis follows on the interpretations made by 
Neumann (2008): 
Because a discourse maintains a degree of regularity in social relations, it produces 
preconditions for action. It constrains how the stuff that the world consists of is 
ordered, and so how people categorize and think about the world. It constrains what is 
thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what is thought of as the ‘natural 
thing’ to do in a given situation. But discourse cannot determine action completely. 
There will always be more than one possible outcome. Discourse analysis aims at 
specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes. (p. 62) 
According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), using text-analysis to reveal the 
meaning of a concept such as ‘security,’ is useful in the sense that through text-analysis one 
uncovers what has been viewed as more important and should be prioritized over other issues. 
Furthermore, they claim that the way to study ‘securitization’ and ‘securitizing moves’ is 
through the study of ‘discourse and political constellations’. It is thought that when an 
argument built on certain ‘rhetoric and semiotic structure’ becomes sufficiently accepted by 
the audience that they will allow violations of rules that would otherwise not be tolerated, 
which would entail a ‘securitization’ of that issue (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 25). 
Post-structuralist theory also engages in conceptualizations that “facilitate critical engagement 
with the ways in which political discourse and text works” (Hansen, 2011, p. 361). As Jensen 
(2015) concludes in his study of Security and Insecurity in the New North, “discourse analysis 
has much to offer by revealing the processes leading to the securitization of a given issue-
area” (n.p.). Although my research does not attempt to identify actual instances of 
‘securitization’ in the High North discourse, using discourse analysis to detect the underlying 
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meanings and representations of the ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ of emerging security issues, 
is a useful approach to critically engage in the current Norwegian security agenda.  
3.3. Summary 
In the following two chapters, I analyse the discourse of the most recent policy papers 
on the High North in order to first critically engage with the Norwegian petroleum discourse, 
then second, to assess the ‘widening’ of Arctic security issues. In chapter 4, on Norwegian 
petroleum and environmental policies, I have not used a set theoretical framework to explain 
the findings; rather I am relying on the epistemological underpinnings of discourse analysis as 
not just a method, but also as a theoretical approach in its own right (Jensen, 2015). 
Nevertheless, I have outlined some theoretical assumptions about the role of the state in 
resource management and how institutions are not static and isolated; instead, they are 
influenced and formed by a multitude of people and interest groups. This is done to explain 
what can be underlying causes for often opposing policies and interests in the High North. 
Finally, chapter 5 analyses the widening of the Arctic security agenda, using post-structuralist 
securitization theory, in addition to drawing on the concept of ‘human security.’ The 
connecting link between the theoretical approach and the method is to investigate the 
discourse, which takes the form of the written word in the policy papers, or using security 
theory as a “discursively constructed speech act” (Grindheim, 2009, p 9).   
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4.0 The Analysis, part I 
 The next two chapters deal with how the Norwegian Government forms petroleum and 
energy policies in an overarching environmental framework in the High North. The analysis is 
based on the presumption of the State as the central actor in policy making. However, the 
State does not act as a static player; rather it is influenced by multiple actors and groups with 
varying degrees of power. I have systematically read through the most recent policy papers on 
Norwegian High North policy, and building on inserts from the papers in addition to other 
official documents and speeches made by Ministers, I have identified the most prevalent 
representations and story-lines concerning the Norwegian petroleum and environmental 
discourse. This is done by using the ‘sandwich method’, where a representation is first 
presented, then supported by appropriate quotes and further discussed, often backed up by 
secondary sources. To draw on representations in discourse and systematically present them 
in an analysis identifies and sets out the basic arguments and assumptions the discourse bearer 
creates when building up arguments. The analysis will outline the foundation of the 
representations and how they sometimes stand in stark contrast to each other. Here it should 
be clarified that the representations and story-lines I draw on are in the scope of this thesis, 
and that this is not an outline of all representations of petroleum and environmental discourse 
in the High North. Rather, it highlights the most prominent and prevailing representations. 
The following chapters combine both empirical data and analysis instead of keeping these two 
separate. This shows the representations and underline the foundation of my arguments.     
4.1 Norwegian petroleum and environmental policies in the High North 
This section outlines the Norwegian petroleum discourse as presented in the most 
recent policy papers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the High North. First, I describe 
the petroleum discourse in light of a brief historical background. Second, I show the dominant 
representations of current petroleum policy making in the High North. Consequently, this 
analysis identifies three dominating representations in Norwegian petroleum policy: first, is 
‘drilling for aid’; the second representation is that Norway should expand its natural gas 
production as ‘gas is a bridging fuel’ into a renewable future; and third, that Norway is 
‘drilling for the environment’. 
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 4.1.1 The beginning: an era of moderation and state ownership  
 At a time where living standards were rising in Western Europe, and countries were 
searching high and low for new energy resources, large petroleum discoveries were made in 
the North Sea that would allow Norway to expand on earlier aspirations for development. The 
discovery of ‘Ekofisk’, in 1969, starts the oil age in Norway (Regjeringen, 2015). At this 
point, the Norwegian state had ensured sovereignty of the continental shelf around Norway, 
and the Government was subsequently the only legal authority that could provide drilling 
licences to companies wanting to explore the Norwegian coast for fossil fuel (Regjeringen, 
2015). In the 1970s, Norway experienced the highest rise in living standard in Western 
Europe, due to the development of the petroleum industry and rising oil prices (Noreng, 
1984). The 25th White paper, The role of petroleum activities in Norwegian Society (1974), 
states “[t]he petroleum discoveries in the North Sea entails that we as a nation will be richer. 
The Government believes that one should first and foremost explore the new possibilities in 
order to develop a qualitative better society10.” (Ministry of Finance, 1974, p.5) 
  A ‘qualitative better society’ meant building a welfare state on the basis of equality for 
all, the economic development of local communities, the targeting of social problems and the 
development of oil production based on efficiency with regards to the environment (Ryggvik, 
2010). In Norwegian petroleum policy, the state plays a central role. Not only did the state 
decide who gets to drill for oil and gas but Norwegian companies have also been in the 
forefront of petroleum exploitation from their entrance into the field of exploration in 1972 
(Regjeringen, 2015). “The organisational pattern for Norwegian petroleum activity has to 
ensure that the Norwegian Government is in full control over all the steps in the activity: 
exploration, production, distribution, export and marketing11” (Ministry of Finance, 1974, p. 
7).  
In addition to the state ensuring sovereignty over the continental shelf and being a part 
of every aspect of the petroleum development, it was also vital that the development followed 
a pace of ‘moderate tempo’. “Desiring a long-term perspective in the exploitation of 
resources, and after a comprehensive evaluation of the social needs, the Government has 
concluded that Norway should take a moderate pace in the extraction of petroleum 
                                                 
10 Authors own translation of: «Petroleumsfunnene i Nordsjøen gjør at vi som nasjon, blir rikere. Regjeringen 
mener at en i første rekke må benytte de nye muligheter til å utvikle et kvalitativt bedre samfunn»  
11 Authors own translation of: «Organisasjonsmønsteret for norsk petroleumsvirksomhet må gi norske 
myndigheter kontroll over alle trinn i virksomheten: leting, produksjon, viderefordeling, eksport og 
markedføring» (p. 7) 
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resources12” (Ministry of Finance, 1974, p. 6). The Government designed the ‘moderate 
policy’ to ensure a sustainable and long-term development path for the petroleum industry and 
to avoid what others had experienced as the ‘Dutch disease’ or the ‘oil curse’. Together with 
what has been called the ‘ten oil commandments’, published in the 1971 White paper 
Recommendation from the extended industrial committee about the exploration for and the 
extraction of underwater natural deposits on the Norwegian Continental Shelf etc., it laid the 
foundation for a Government-controlled resource exploration (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate [NDP], 2010).  
Whereas the 1974 White paper underlined the need for ‘moderate tempo’, the 1971 
White papers’ so called ‘ten commandments’ laid down the criteria for state involvement in 
all levels of the petroleum industry. The first commandment highlights that there will be state 
supervision of all activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. The third commandment states 
that all business activity would be developed based on the petroleum industry. Further, the 
fourth commandment underlines that existing commercial activity must be taken into 
consideration, as well as the nature and environment when developing the oil industry. The 
seventh commandment informs that the state will be involved in all levels of the Norwegian 
petroleum industry with both a national and international perspective. Moreover, a state 
owned Oil Company would be established to ensure Norwegian commercial interests, as 
stated in the eighth commandment. Finally, the ninth commandment highlighted that an 
activity plan for the development of the industry north of the 62nd parallel that would take the 
unique socio-political factors into account, must be adopted (NDP, 2010). In the early 1970s, 
Norwegian petroleum-policy emphasised moderation and a reluctance to rely solely on the oil 
industry for the future development path of Norwegian society. However, as governments 
changed and new voices became prominent in the policy forming, a new petroleum era was 
underway not merely a decade after the ‘moderate policy’ of the 1970s. 
4.1.2. From policy of moderation to full throttle 
In accordance with the policy of ‘moderate tempo’, an annual upper limit of 90 million 
tons of oil equivalent production was adopted in 1973. This came under increasing 
contestation in the 1980s, and in 1993 this embargo on tempo and investments was 
completely discarded (Kristoffersen, 2014). The tempo was set so high, that in 2009, Norway 
was one of the countries in the world with highest production rate compared to its remaining 
                                                 
12 The translation is taken from: Kristoffersen (2014) Drilling oil into Arctic minds? State security, industry 
consensus and local contestation. A dissertation for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor – May 2014. P. 20 
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reserves (Ryggvik, 2010). Today, we live in a reality where the oil industry is the country´s 
most important single export commodity (48.9% of all export). It accounts for 21.5% of BNP, 
and ensures almost 30% of the State’s yearly income (Fakta, 2014). As overall production 
rates exploded in the 1990s and into the 2000s, new areas for further development became in 
high demand. Norway’s overall petroleum production is widely believed to have peaked, 
reaching its highest production rate in 2000-2001. Since then, oil production has decreased 
severely, and even though gas production has increased, the overall production is still 
significantly lower today (Ryggvik, 2013). Nevertheless, the government’s focus on 
maintaining a high level of petroleum production has not faltered, as there has been no official 
acceptance of ‘peak oil’ by the state. In 2005, the Government published its first White paper 
on the High North, Opportunities and Challenges in the North13, where oil exploration was 
one of the focus-points for future development in the region.  
The new opportunities in the North are tied to the assumed large oil and gas reserves 
under the seabed. The exploitation of these resources will affect the development of 
the High North in many decades to come. There is a possibility that the High North, in 
a long-term perspective, can become the most important petroleum province in 
Europe14. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005, p. 6) 
 It is important to note that this trend in the Norwegian petroleum policy has not changed in 
the more recent plans for exploration in the High North. Nor do we see a move away from a 
petroleum dependent development path for the area christened ‘the new energy province of 
Europe’. If anything, the tone of the discourse has become more deterministic and certain of 
the expected petroleum resources waiting to be exploited, as the Arctic is ‘opening up’ due to 
global warming: 
We now see that the presence of oil and gas deposits also open up the Barents Sea as a 
new European energy province. Exploiting the opportunities of the High North is one 
of the most important components of the Government’s High North Strategy. 
Responsible exploitation of these resources will help to safeguard the welfare of the 
future generations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 67) 
The heightened focus of petroleum development in the Arctic appears to be a 
consequence of a widening discrepancy between the current high production rate and the 
                                                 
13 ‘Muligheter og Utfordringer I Nord’ 
14 Author’s own translation 
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decrease in the reserves of existing petroleum fields. After reaching a peak in the production 
over ten years ago, and keeping one of the highest production rates in the world, according to 
British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, Norway would have only 
8.8 years of production left if keeping up the same production level as up until 2008 
(Ryggvik, 2010). All the while, the Government is optimistic about the remaining oil and gas 
resources, as we have produced and sold ‘only15’ 45% of all available oil and gas on the 
Norwegian continental shelf, with 37% of the remaining petroleum resources remaining 
undiscovered (Norskpetroleum, 2015). Of the undiscovered resources, as much as 43% are 
believed to be found in the Barents Sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b).  
 
 
Fig.1 Grey area marks the produced and sold quantities of oil and gas, while the lighter areas represents the 
unexplored and undiscovered resources. The image of large quantities still remaining, stands in slight opposition 
to the next figure of how much oil has been produced and the downwards level of the past decades production. 
Source: http://www.norskpetroleum.no/?attachment_id=8347  
 
                                                 
15 “The oil directorate’s estimate of the total discovered and undiscovered petroleum resources on the 
Norwegian continental shelf is about 14.1 billion standard cubic metres oil equivalent. Of this, only 45 present 
is sold and delivered”. Here, the oil directorate puts a positive undertone of the amount of oil/gas that has 
been sold and delivered by using the word ‘only’.  
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Fig 2 From this we can see that oil production peaked in 2001, and although gas production has increased, the 
overall development is down from 2004. Source: http://www.ssb.no/energi-og-
industri/statistikker/ogprodre/kvartal/2014-11-21#content  
 
Much of the Government’s ‘energy optimism’ is based on the frequently sited report 
made by the US Geological Survey (USGS) in 2008, which states that up to 22% of the 
world’s undiscovered petroleum resources are found above the Arctic Circle (USGS, 2008). 
In the most recent Strategy paper from 2009, New Building Blocks in the North, and in the 
White paper from 2012 The High North. Visions and Strategies, in addition to the most recent 
Report from 2014 Norway’s Arctic policy by the new government, we see clear 
representations of the Government’s intent to develop the High North as an energy province 
for the future. In the 2009 Strategy paper, it is stated “[t]he Government will seek to ensure 
that petroleum activities become a driving force of business development and economic 
activity in Northern Norway” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 24). Similar 
representations for petroleum development are seen in the following statement, “[i]t is 
therefore important that Norwegian policy is designed to make the High North attractive to oil 
companies so that they give it priority in their portfolios” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, 
p. 18). In light of these statements, there is no doubt as to what the Government sees as its 
main priority in its High North policy, and using the word ‘designed’ about the policy paper 
indicates clear intent.  
Opening up the Barents Sea for oil exploration is first driven by the necessity of 
finding new areas for petroleum exploration, as the older wells are emptying quicker than new 
oil reserves are found. Furthermore, and more controversially, this development path is a 
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result of close collaboration between oil companies and the Government (NRK Brennpunkt, 
2008). Konkraft is a forum, set up in the beginning of the 2000s, where representatives from 
oil companies and government officials met off record to discuss the future of Norwegian 
petroleum development. As the industry has already been able to tap most of the oil in the 
lower latitudes, gaining access to prospective areas in the Barents Sea and in the 
Lofoten/Vesterålenen/Senja areas in order to be globally more competitive, is becoming an 
important priority (Kristoffersen, 2014). Directed by Konkraft and chaired by the Minister of 
Petroleum and Energy, a quarterly meeting between representatives from the oil industry and 
politicians called ‘Topplederforum’ (top-leader forum) was set up. This was conducted behind 
closed doors, in order for the participants to speak freely and off record (Kristoffersen, 2014). 
According to revelations in a Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) documentary 
(NRK Brennpunkt, 2008), Konkraft facilitated meetings and designed lobbying strategies, 
among them how to create a better environmental profile around the petroleum industry. 
Throughout the official High North policy papers, the representation of an ‘environmental 
petroleum production’ is repeatedly emphasized. This can henceforth be attributed to an 
offensive strategy between the industry and politicians in order to gain public acceptance for 
petroleum exploitation in vulnerable areas. The representation ‘drilling for the environment’ 
will be further explored in the forthcoming analysis. The following insert from the 2009 
Strategy paper shows the Government’s intent on a future petroleum-driven development 
path: 
It is important for the Government that the development of new oil and gas ﬁelds 
results in increased productivity in Northern Norway and in the rest of the country. 
Exploitation of the petroleum resources of the High North must support the positive 
developments in the High North. Petroleum activities will be a major driving force for 
new technology intensive activities in Northern Norway. In order to bring this about, 
an industry must be built up in Northern Norway that can position itself both 
nationally and internationally. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 67) 
 However, the same Strategy paper also underlines the environmental concerns for expanding 
petroleum production into certain vulnerable areas. In both the 2009 and 2012 policy-papers 
there is an underlying tension between the need for expanding petroleum production further 
north, and the environmental consequences this would entail: 
Challenges are associated with the effects of fisheries, ship traffic and petroleum 
activities, and with environmental toxins, radioactivity and introduced species. This 
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particularly applies to the area from Lofoten to Vesterålen, inshore areas, 
Tromsøflaket, Eggakanten, the ice edge, the polar front and the sea areas surrounding 
Svalbard. These are areas that, on the basis of scientific assessments, are of major 
importance for biodiversity and biological production, and where possible injurious 
effects may have long-term or irreversible consequences. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2009a, p. 74) 
Here there is an ongoing debate between the intensification of petroleum exploration on the 
one hand, and the identification of vulnerable areas in need of additional protection from 
further petroleum development on the other hand. We will see in the forthcoming discourse 
that the ‘environmental argument’ is both used in the pro-drilling discourse as well as the 
‘anti-drilling’ discourse, and creates an underlying paradox in the whole High North policy 
making.  
4.1.3 From words to action in the High North 
There has been a change in government in the past two years, which made me 
interested in following the developing petroleum discourse in the High North during this time. 
In general, policy papers are drawn up when the Government wants to present matters to the 
Storting that does not necessarily require direct action, serving as guiding documents and is 
often the prerequisite for a bill or a law to be passed at a later stage (Regjeringen, 2008). 
Moreover, the policy paper can span from one Government to the next, however, the new 
Government might present a policy report with their own visions for a policy area. This is 
what was done when the new Government came to power in 2013, and when analysing the 
policy papers before 2013 and comparing it with the policy statements that emerged with the 
new Government, a shift in the discourse became noticeable. The previous Government, as 
has been shown, spoke with clear intent in developing the petroleum industry farther north. 
The new Government on their side is talking about an ‘offensive’ petroleum development, as 
in aggressive. In the report Norway’s Arctic policy (2014b), the petroleum industry is 
described as the core contributor to the Norwegian economy, and that further development of 
the petroleum industry in the Arctic is necessary in order to keep up the income level and 
production scale: 
The oil and gas industry is the largest contributor to the Norwegian economy, and 
provides major opportunities for increased employment and growth in Northern 
Norway. The Government will carry out an ambitious oil and gas policy, which 
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facilitates future development projects in the High North, including by offering 
attractive exploration areas offering attractive exploration areas. Access to land and a 
high level of activity are important prerequisites for the further development of oil- 
and gas-related business ashore. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 20) 
In the original report, written in Norwegian, the statement “[t]he Government will carry out 
an ambitious oil and gas policy (…)”, translates to “[r]egjeringen vil føre en offensiv 
petroleumspolitikk”(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, p. 28). The direct English translation 
of this according to the oxford dictionary is: “[t]he Government will carry out an offensive 
petroleum policy”. The word “offensiv”, in Norwegian, with its closest synonyms “aggressiv” 
(aggressive) or “angrepslysten” (want to attack)16 carries with it a different meaning that the 
word “ambitious”. The former word is a stronger adjective than the latter.   
Likewise, the representation of a deterministic petroleum politic in the Norwegian 
version of the policy paper is further underlined by Prime Minister Erna Solberg’s 
introduction of the 2014 Report, stating, “we will go from word to action in Norway’s High 
North politics” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, p. 3). The representation here is that the 
previous Government has mostly been talking, while the new Government will take further 
action in the High North politics. This quote directly translated from the Norwegian version, 
which says “[v]i skal gå fra ord til handling i nordområdepolitikken” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2014a, p. 3). In the English version of this report however, this statement is 
translated: “[w]e intend to work hard to put our Arctic policy into practice” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 3). First, this wording does not send a message that the new 
Government will differentiate itself from the previous Government. Second, it is not a 
message with deterministic character, as the word ‘intend’ is not a strong verb. These two 
translations render me a little perplexed. Why does the Norwegian version of the report speak 
with a more deterministic voice than the English translation? It is merely a question of 
translation complexities? Alternatively, does it signify a conscious choice to apply one voice 
for the Norwegian audience and one voice for the international? 
Nevertheless, the proverb ‘action speaks louder than words’ can be applied to the 
actions taken by the new Government after coming to power in 2013. The new coalition 
Government formed by the two right-wing parties; the Conservative Party and the Progressive 
Party, in addition to the more centre orientated Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal 
Party, started their time in the Government with hard negotiations regarding opening 
                                                 
16 Synonymer hentet fra www.synonymer.no 
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Lofoten/Vesterålen/Senja area for oil exploration. This area underwent seismic mapping in 
the period of 2007-2009, and is assumed to hold the largest amount of easily accessible oil 
and gas in the High North (Kristoffersen, 2014). This is a highly contested area for petroleum 
exploration, due to large primary industries of fishing, tourism and agriculture in this pristine 
and unique wilderness, which is under potential threat by having oilrigs within close 
proximity. After intense negotiations between the four ruling parties, they had to agree to 
keep the question of petroleum exploration undecided until the next election round in 2017, as 
this is one of the key polarizing policy-areas between the four coalition parties. Nevertheless, 
the current Government has put words into actions by opening up new exploration areas in the 
Barents Sea in the 23rd licensing round, as stated in the report:  
The Government will offer new acreage in both geologically known and unknown 
areas, within the parts of the High North that are open to oil and gas activities. Awards 
in the Predefined Areas in 2014 consentrates on the geologically known areas and will 
make an important contribution to the further exploration of the Barents Sea. Large 
parts of the High North have not been explored. In the 23rd licensing round, for the 
first time since 1994 the Government will give access to new, interesting exploration 
opportunities in the southeast of the Barents Sea. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, 
p 20) 
Included in these ‘new and interesting’ areas are areas surrounding the much debated ice 
edge, which is on the list of vulnerable and valuable areas of the 2009 Strategy paper, where 
possible injurious effects could damage and destroy the regions biodiversity. The Government 
argues that global warming and melting ice has naturally moved the ice edge, including the 
vulnerable areas. Prime Minister Erna Solberg is quoted saying, “[w]e have not moved the ice 
edge, it has moved itself17” when defending the decision to include areas that the Norwegian 
Polar Institute advised against (Olsen, 2015). According to the social geographer, Berit 
Kristoffersen, the intensified petroleum focus is in line with the last decade’s petroleum 
policy of extracting as much as possible in the shortest time possible (Olsen, 2015). In the 
following sections, I look at how certain representations of the Norwegian petroleum industry 
are created and/or reproduced in order to argue for a continuance and speeding up of 
exploitation in the Arctic. This includes the representation of ‘drilling as aid’, ‘natural gas as a 
bridging fuel’ and that Norway is ‘drilling for the environment’.   
                                                 
17 Authors own translation 
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4.1.4. Drilling as aid 
 One of the most prominent and reoccurring representations in the recent Arctic 
petroleum discourse is that Norway should exploit oil in the Barents Sea to help the 
developing word. This builds on an image of Norwegian altruism, which is now visible in the 
current petroleum policy discourse. In January 2015, I participated in the annual conference 
Arctic Frontier in Tromsø, as a prelude to my research for this thesis. One of the events that 
set me on the course of studying Norwegian High North policy was the speech made by the 
cureent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende. He spoke of the many challenges we are 
facing in the High North due to climate change, but also the opportunities this creates for 
further resource exploration. Moreover, he underlined the link between the developing 
world’s growing demand for energy in order to eradicate poverty, and Norway’s 
advantageous position to be able to provide this needed energy:  
The global demand for energy will increase by 35–40 % over the next 20 years, 
according to the International Energy Agency. The demand for energy will grow 
immensely in developing countries. Without electricity, there can be no development, 
no economic growth. As the Arctic becomes more accessible, we will be able to 
produce more energy. (Brende, 2015b) 
This statement from the Foreign Minister appears to be built on reproduced discourse from at 
least a decade ago. The former Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Thorhild Widvey stated in 
her last interview as a Minister in 2005 that: 
Norway has a global responsibility to extract more energy to the world in order to 
contribute to increase the welfare for the developing countries. (…) It is the poorest 
countries that in 25 years should have their energy needs satisfied. What rights do we 
have to say that when we have satisfied our energy need, we should just turn off the 
tap and deny other countries the same increase in welfare as we have enjoyed?(…) 
The developing world should be allowed a larger share of the energy resources. 
Norway is in possession of some of the remaining, undiscovered natural resources in 
the world. It cannot be that we should not open up for the poor countries to receive 
access to energy when their turn is up18. (Quoted in Hellestøl, 2005b, p. 2, as sited in 
Ihlen, 2007, p. 110-111) 
                                                 
18 Author’s own translation 
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Norway is one of the countries in the world that gives the most foreign aid per capita, 
around 1% of GDP (SSB, 2014b). The notion of Norway as ‘altruistic’ and a nation that helps 
people in need is underlined by the following statement made in a report on Power and 
Humanitarianism in Norway: 
Since the early 1990s, «Norway» has been built up as an international brand; as a 
particularly peace loving and aid friendly country with special tasks in world politics. 
Constructing this brand has occurred through a policy of ‘engagement’ – the work for 
conflict resolution, peace, democracy and human rights – around the world. The image 
of Norway as a moral and humanitarian super power19. (NOU, 2003, p. 51) 
That the Norwegian Ministers draws the parallel between the developing world’s energy 
poverty and Norway’s role as a trusted and natural energy supplier is a natural continuance of 
the already established altruistic representation. Whereas we have previously been talking 
about ensuring peace, human rights and democracy, there is now a reason to presume that 
eradicating the developing world’s ‘energy poverty’ should be included in the list of 
representations of Norwegian altruism. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende 
(2015a), develops the ideas of ‘energy as aid’ further in an article published by the Harvard 
International Review, again with a striking similarity to the statement made by former 
Minister Widvey: 
(…)as the Arctic becomes more accessible, there may be more efforts to extract the 
energy reserves hidden beneath the surface and feed the demands of a growing planet. 
The world needs energy. Lack of access to energy is a barrier to development. 
According to the International Energy Agency, over 1.3 billion people live without 
access to electricity, and the global demand for energy will increase by 35 to 40 
percent over the next 20 years, mostly in developing countries. (Brende, 2015a) 
Here there is a representation of Norwegian energy as a solution to the world’s growing 
energy poverty. The statement ‘feed the demands of a growing planet’ draws on a storyline of 
feeding a hungry world, and is here interpreted as a part of Norwegian aid effort to save the 
world’s poor. The national identity of an altruistic Norway is maintained, in addition to 
ensuring our own economic development. However, our own economic gains are duly left out 
of the representation of Norway as saving the energy poor with clean Arctic energy. There is 
                                                 
19 Author’s own translation 
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also an underlying assumption from our politicians that since the world needs energy, it 
straightforward equals that the world needs Norwegian energy (as oppose to energy they 
could produce themselves from sun and wind). Not only does the developing world need 
Norwegian energy, it is Norway’s duty to provide it to them as an altruistic and giving nation.  
4.1.5. Natural gas as a ‘bridging fuel’. 
The storyline of using natural gas as a ‘transition fuel’ or ‘bridging fuel’ has 
developed rapidly in the international petroleum discourse in recent years, and the Norwegian 
Government has followed suit in adopting this rhetoric in its High North policy making.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has highlighted the advantages of making 
more use of natural gas as a replacement for coal. Norway and Europe are long-term 
gas partners. We will continue exploration for gas – particularly in the High North. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p.15) 
As previously highlighted, Norway is, today, primarily a gas producing country, as the oil 
reserves have steadily been decreasing since the early 2000s. Furthermore, gas constitutes the 
bulk of the expected petroleum resources in the unexplored areas in the Arctic. Whereas the 
2012 White paper explains that natural gas could replace coal in order to decrease greenhouse 
gas emissions, the representation of gas as a ‘bridging fuel’ is developed further in recent 
statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende: 
The Arctic is home to globally significant oil and gas reserves. (…)  a large share of 
the global energy supply will still have to come from fossil fuels for decades. Even 
while the global economy shifts away from oil, gas will remain an important bridging 
fuel by reducing emissions without dispensing with them. For that reason, it is safe to 
assume that Arctic energy will have its day—and in the Arctic summer, a day is a long 
time. (Brende, 2015a) 
Consequently, the representation of gas as a ‘bridging fuel’ has become one of the 
more prominent arguments in the High North discourse in favour of expanding the Arctic 
petroleum industry. This discourse arose in the aftermath of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2007 Executive Summary, presenting natural gas as a transition 
fuel in phasing out coal and oil, in addition to acting as a ‘bridge’ into a renewable energy 
future (IPCC, 2007). Moreover, the IEA has signalled that we might be in a ‘golden age for 
gas’ (IEA, 2012). This discourse was quickly adopted by the industry, and in addition to being 
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a key argument for further Norwegian gas development in the Arctic, has also been used to 
promote the contested extraction of unconventional gas resources in, for instance, Canada: 
Natural gas is the world’s cleanest-burning fossil fuel. B.C. [British Colombia] exports 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) can significantly lower global greenhouse gas 
emissions by replacing coal-fired power plants and oil-based transportation fuels with 
a much cleaner alternative. LNG development in B.C. can have lower lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions than anywhere else in the world by promoting the use of 
clean electricity to power LNG plants. B.C.’s LNG industry will contribute to our 
leadership in the transition to a low carbon economy. (BC MEM, 2012, p. 2, as sited in 
Stephenson, Doukas & Shaw, 2012, p. 454)  
Although natural gas might be the cleanest-burning fossil fuel, the emissions from 
production is still contested and not taken sufficiently into consideration. As there is an 
increase in the development of unconventional gas reserves from shale and sand, emission 
rates also vary considerably. Stephenson, Doukas and Shaw (2012) argue that the discourse 
around gas as a ‘bridging fuel’ should be abandoned, and that it would be more fruitful to 
focus more on transparency and openness around the production side of natural gas. More 
importantly, when considering gas as a transition fuel, one should ask, “[w]hat types of 
natural gas, under what conditions, can contribute to a more sustainable energy future?” 
(Stephenson, Doukas & Shaw, 2012, p. 458). Although natural gas production in the Arctic is 
more conventional, it is nevertheless conducted in very climate-challenging, contested and 
vulnerable arena. However, if the Arctic Frontier conference, or the latest statements made by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende is anything to go by, it does not appear that 
Norway has abandoned the ‘bridging’ discourse around natural gas production; rather it 
appears to have intensified and turned into one of the key arguments for fossil fuel exploration 
in the Arctic: 
 Renewable energy use should, and will, increase considerably, but a large share of the 
global energy supply will still have to come from sources such as gas. Gas will be an 
important bridge between a fossil fuel based and a low-carbon economy. Due to 
stringent requirements and strict regulation over the course of many years, the 
Norwegian oil and gas sector is a world leader in terms of limiting negative 
environmental impacts. Greenhouse gas emissions from oil and gas production on the 
Norwegian continental shelf are considerably lower than the international average. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 14) 
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This last insert links directly to the next representation in the High North discourse, which is 
one where Norwegian resource exploration is one of the most environmental in the world, 
henceforth, Norway should drill for oil for the sake of the environment. The statement also 
links to the storyline of Norway being the ‘best in class’, casting a positive light on 
Norwegian petroleum exploration.  
4.1.6 Drilling for the environment 
The development of the representation ‘drilling for the environment’ rests on multiple 
strands of discourse. On one hand, it is based on Norway’s role as an environmental ‘steward’ 
of the Arctic; that we know best how to protect the fragile polar environment. Furthermore, 
there has been an ‘othering of Russia’ as an environmental foe to the Arctic environment, 
where Norway has to show the way towards more environmental resource exploration 
(Hønneland & Jensen 2008; Jensen 2010; Jensen 2015). This ‘othering’ has recently 
developed into a representation of Norway as one of the most environmental petroleum 
nations in the world, and that it would benefit the global greenhouse gas emission rate if 
Norway continues exploring petroleum in the High North. Finally, I conclude that in the 
Norwegian High North policies, the use of the word ‘environment’ can be interpreted as a 
‘buzzword’, creating enough ambiguity in policy making to satisfy several strands of 
interests.  
First, Norway has positioned itself as a ‘steward’ of the Arctic environment, and the 
underlying theme in the High North policy papers is that any form of development in the 
Arctic will have to take a sustainable and integrated approach. It is in the Arctic we see global 
climate change occurring first. The circumpolar region is warming twice as fast as the rest of 
the planet. The melting land ice will increase global sea levels, and the opened waters will 
speed up further climate change due to the positive feedback mechanism of the dark sea. 
Policy paper statements maintain an awareness of Arctic environmental responsibility: 
Norway must lead the way in the environmental area, be an active partner for other 
countries and a long-term and trustworthy guardian of environmental and cultural 
values in the High North. The Government provides for wealth creation through 
sustainable use of marine and land resources, while safeguarding the functioning and 
productivity of the ecosystem. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 73) 
The Government intends Norway to be the best steward of the environment and the 
natural resources in the High North. We will protect the environment in the High 
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North and facilitate value creation and human activity while ensuring that ecosystems, 
ecological goods and services and biodiversity are maintained. (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2012, p. 97) 
The representation of Norway as a ‘steward’ of the Arctic environment builds neatly 
on the altruistic discourse of Norway drilling for aid. As previously discussed, being a country 
with a strong aid culture is important for Norwegians’ national identity. Similarly, Norway 
has also been at the forefront of international environmental diplomacy, with the 1987 
Brundtland Report of ‘Our Common Future’, where the concept of ‘sustainable development’ 
was applied to environmental governance in order to protect the environment for future 
generations. The wording of a sustainable future for the Arctic environment is very much 
present in the current High North policies:  
Climate change, ocean acidification and increasing levels of activity will give rise to 
new challenges for the authorities responsible for environmental and natural resource 
management, and they will have to meet new demands for knowledge and adaptation. 
Norway must therefore develop its knowledge-based environmental and resource 
management regime. We need to succeed in this so that the inevitable processes of 
change do not cause degradation of important habitats and ecosystems or depletion of 
living resources that we need as a basis for development and welfare in the future. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 16) 
 The development of Norway’s ‘environmentalism’ in the world, and the image of the 
rightful ‘steward’ of the Arctic were furthered deepened in the 1990s after a sharp increase in 
reports of serious environmental disasters occurring not far from the Norwegian border in the 
Russian north. Orchestrated by sensationalist mass-media and idealistic environmental 
organizations, this ‘environmental-disaster discourse’ was picked up by the Government and 
adopted in the High North policy-making, where Norwegian aid money was poured into 
cleaning up the nuclear disaster in northwest Russia (Hønneland, 2005). The renewed focus of 
the Barents area in the 1990s gave way to the ‘High North euphoria20’ of the 2000s, after 
reports started coming out of the substantial amounts of natural resources hiding under the 
melting ice. The political discourse quickly adopted the story-line that Russia was already in 
progress of extracting valuable resources, and in light of their poor environmental records, 
Norway have to join in to help ensuring a higher environmental standard in the High North 
                                                 
20‘ Nordområdeeuforien’ (Hønneland and Jensen 2008) 
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(Hønneland & Jensen, 2008). Jensen (2010) looks closer at this phenomenon where one 
discourse [drilling for the environment] goes into the opposing discourse [no drilling], taking 
the core message and making it their own. This is referred to as ‘discourse co-optation’, which 
illustrates the way the oil industry took the environmentalists argument of ‘Russia as an 
environmental foe who should not drill for oil’ and made this the main argument for why 
Norway should pursue drilling in the High North (Hønneland & Jensen, 2008; Jensen, 2010). 
Consequently, the environmental organizations stood behind, bereft, with a weakened 
argument watching the industry and politicians developing a discourse of ‘drilling for the 
environment’. 
 In recent High North discourse, there is a representation that takes this rhetoric a step 
further, and presents the Norwegian petroleum industry as more environmental than Russia, 
and also the rest of the world; therefore it is more beneficial for the environment that Norway 
continues resource exploration in the High North: 
 
Due to stringent requirements and strict regulation over the course of many years, the 
Norwegian oil and gas sector is a world leader in terms of limiting negative 
environmental impacts. Greenhouse gas emissions from oil and gas production on the 
Norwegian continental shelf are considerably lower than the international average. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 14) 
In order for this argument to have bearing, it would mean that Norwegian petroleum 
exploitation would automatically be replaced by a less environmentally friendly petroleum 
production method elsewhere. Nevertheless, this representation can be viewed as a natural 
continuation of the discourse of Norway ‘drilling for the environment’.  
 
 Another aspect of the ‘drilling for the environment’ discourse is how the word 
‘environment’ is used as a ‘buzzword’. In the representation of environmental Norwegian 
petroleum exploration, there is very little emphasis on what the ‘environment’ really means. 
According to Cornwall (2010), when forming policies, it is important to create excess room 
with enough ambiguity in order to satisfy the multiple actors and audiences affected by the 
policies. As previously shown, the High North policies have been a result of impulses not 
only from politicians and their advisors, but also been shaped by informal meetings with the 
industry through forums such as Konkraft. When exploring the PR-strategies of the 
Norwegian petroleum industry, Ihlen (2007) outlines an emerging norm embedded within the 
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oil industry and the Government, underlying that ‘what is good for the oil industry, is good 
for Norway’. This is represented in the High North policies, where it is repeatedly shown that 
oil revenues are linked closely to the running of a well-functioning welfare system. “The oil 
and gas industry is the largest contributor to the Norwegian economy, and provides major 
opportunities for increased employment and growth in Northern Norway” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 20). Additionally, for the oil industry, it is increasingly important 
to position itself in an environmental light as the world is waking up to mounting climate 
changes caused by greenhouse gas emissions. This, as has been shown, is also evident by the 
representations presented in the High North policy papers, portraying the Norwegian oil 
industry in a more favourable environmental light than their competitors. The reader of the 
High North policy papers are continuously faced with representations such as, “[w]e must 
therefore facilitate the coexistence of different industries within an environmentally 
sustainable framework” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 14), which, when considering it 
closely, says nothing of what its true implications are. What is an ‘environmentally 
sustainable framework?’ What aspects of the ‘environment’ is taken into consideration when 
making such a statement? Can we say that industrial development such as oil exploration is at 
all ‘environmentally sustainable?’ When the Government states that Norwegian oil production 
follows the strictest environmental regulations, is it henceforth implied that the oil production 
is environmental and that these regulations are strict enough to actually protect the 
environment?  Cornwall (2010: 3) states, “buzzwords get their ‘buzz’ from being in-words, 
words that deﬁne what is in vogue.” ‘Environment’ or ‘environmental’ is here interpreted as 
such a buzzword from the sheer number of times it is used in the Norwegian High North 
policy-papers. Moreover, buzzwords exist so that they can be used without further reference 
or explanation of meaning, other than what the reader attaches to the word. In effect, 
buzzwords in policy papers aid to disguise multiple agendas, giving the policy makers space 
to wriggle around and alienate their responsibilities (Cornwall 2010).    
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4.2 Summary: Polarizing preferences in the Norwegian High North Policy 
After the first High North White paper was published in 2005, it has been repeated 
that the Government regards the High North as its most strategic and important foreign policy 
area. This thesis outlines the discourse around the development of Norwegian petroleum 
policy to detect how certain representations are reproduced and developed to justify the need 
to carry out petroleum exploration in contested areas. In the discourse around petroleum 
exploration in the High North there is an element of interdiscursivity. General assumptions of 
good governance and Arctic stewardship concerning the environment are used to argue for 
why Norway should carry out petroleum exploration in these fragile areas. Interdiscursivity 
shows us how discourse can be adopted from one area to reproduce arguments and 
representations to make them stronger in another. Likewise, the story-line of Norway as an 
altruistic nation that has a strong aid profile and regards itself as a country that provides 
‘sustainability to the world,’ underlines the argument that Norway should provide 
environmental energy to help poor people in the developing world. According to Leira et al. 
(2007), identity building can be seen in light of a nation’s foreign policies. Through foreign 
policy statements, images of state-identity are created, and through actions, these images are 
further reproduced and challenged; strengthened or weakened (Leira et al., 2007). 
Historically, there reigned a broad agreement that Norway was not to politicise its oil and 
energy politics and bring it into the realm of foreign policy (Leira & Sverdrup, 2013). 
However, as Norway has become one of the leading gas exporters in the world, as well as a 
large oil producer, keeping oil and energy interests out of the foreign policy process has not 
succeeded in reality, as can be seen by the discourse in the High North policy-papers. In a 
study on Norwegian national interests and identities conducted by Leira and Sverdrup (2013), 
they conclude that although international reputation as an environmentally conscious nation is 
regarded as important theoretically; in practice it is not emphasized in the same manner as 
economic and energy interests, which are regarded by far as the most important foreign policy 
interests.  
The representations and storylines we see in the High North policy-papers support the 
conclusions made by Leira and Sverdrup (2013) that the economic interests around an 
intensified petroleum development in the Arctic are weighted more favourably than protecting 
the environment by high mitigation standards and trying to limit ice melting. Nevertheless, as 
the government is masking their ‘real’ reasons for carrying out resource exploration in the 
Arctic through a discourse of ‘drilling for aid and the environment’, in addition to arguing that 
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natural gas should act as a ‘bridging fuel’ towards a renewable future, it creates paradoxes and 
‘double speak’ which can ultimately weaken the Governments arguments. From an outside 
perspective, Norwegian High North policy can be interpreted as two-faced, especially if the 
High north policy is seen from an environmental perspective. Historically, Norway has prided 
itself with being a ‘steward’ and ‘protector’ of the fragile Arctic environment, in line with the 
altruistic approach taken towards international policy. Two realities became clear in the wake 
of the Cold War - first, that global warming was occurring much faster in Artic than in the rest 
of the world, and second, that almost a quarter of the worlds undiscovered fossil fuel reserves 
could be under the melting Arctic ice. In this aftermath, Norway has conducted a two-pronged 
foreign policy in the High North. Moreover, this two-pronged policy seemingly operates side 
by side, untroubled by its opposing messages. The mid-2000s saw a growing discourse 
around Norway’s role around protecting the Arctic environment (Leira et al., 2007). The 
Management Plan for the Marine Environment in the Barents Sea and outside the Lofoten Sea 
areas, published in 2006 by the Ministry of Climate and Environment, laid the foundation for 
conducting all forms of industrial development under strict environmental regulation in order 
to protect the ecosystems. The opening statements show this:  
 
The eco-systems in the Barents Sea and in the seas around Lofoten has important 
environmental value, and contains living resources that forms the basis of significant 
value creation. (…) The Government finds it increasingly important to ensure these 
oceans fundamental ecosystems in a long-term perspective, in so much as it remains 
clean, rich and productive21. (Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2006, p. 7) 
 
Similar wordings are also visible in the High North policy papers, as shown 
previously, and the fluidity between the environment and economic interests goes for most of 
the time hand in hand, not really in contradiction, but ambiguous enough to pose questions. 
Nevertheless, areas of polarizing preferences are emerging, as it becomes challenging to 
maintain a consistent Arctic politic with the two oft-opposing storylines. For instance, in May 
2015, the Government, in unison, decided to withdraw the Pension Fund out of international 
coal production (NRK, 2015). However, while this is unfolding, the Government is at the 
same time standing firm behind and supporting a subsidized coal industry in Svalbard, with 
the equivalent CO2 emissions of 3 million cars (Naturverforbundet, 2009). Moreover, 
                                                 
21 Authors own translation 
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coinciding with the decision of withdrawing the Pension Fund from coal came the news that 
the Government invested 500 million NOK in the coal company Store Norske Spitsbergen 
Kullkompani, which, without the Government’s financial support, was facing bankruptcy 
(Kramviken, 2015). That governments in general follows a politic of self-interest and 
opportunistic economic development is not surprising. Moreover, it is in line with a growing 
view within social studies that the state fails in environmental governance, as it is unable to 
act in the global governance structure of an increasingly globalized world driven by political-
economic deregulation and privatization (Kristoffersen, 2014). Nevertheless, we have seen 
that the state is not a static actor in environmental governance, and that there is a high degree 
of fluid and transformative preferences that governs policy-making. However, from a 
perspective of developing a national identity around Norway as an ‘environmentally 
conscious’ nation, these opposing preferences become problematic, and will not be helpful 
when attempting to set high international standards for future climate negotiation, as well as 
supporting Norway’s role as a ‘steward’ of the Arctic environment.  
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5.0 The Analysis, part II  
 Chapter 4 concludes that there is a high degree of fluidity and contradiction in the 
Norwegian High North policy papers. On the one hand, there are clear economic drivers that 
steer policy making, such as the continuance of a petroleum industry. On the other hand, there 
are important and urgent environmental concerns that, in accordance with Norwegian 
altruistic national identity, also become a central theme in High North politics. The next step 
is to investigate whether the discourse around energy and environment in the High North 
policy making can be seen as a part of the overarching security discourse. I have investigated 
Norwegian policy documents to uncover representations of energy and environmental policy 
that can be seen as a ‘widening’ of the traditionalist security approach in the High North. In 
the theory chapter, ‘security’ is identified as a speech act, and ‘securitizing moves’ are seen as 
‘self-referential’ forms of speech (Grindheim, 2009). In order for something to be seen as a 
security threat, it just has to be perceived as a threat, not necessarily be an actual threat or 
invoke extraordinary measures. Investigating the widening of the security concept in relation 
to the Arctic becomes a link in understanding the many driving-forces behind policy making 
in the High North. Although the state, in a traditionalist approach, sets the security agenda, 
there is now an increased focus on including other actors to partake in the security debate 
(Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). This chapter first outlines the widening of the security concept in 
the High North. Furthermore, I look at issues identified as security concerns in the policy 
papers, and attempt to identify the voices behind the agenda setting in order to understand the 
driving forces behind Norwegian policy making in the Arctic.  
5.1. Moving away from a traditionalist security approach in the High North 
5.1.1 From militarization to cooperation 
According to Heininen (2014), Arctic security concerns match those of classical 
geopolitics. Military security is formed based on the technology models of geopolitics, while 
resource politics are formed around resource models of geopolitics, driving relations between 
the Arctic and the rest of the world. During the Cold War, the High North was an important 
and strategic region for the Soviet Union, where the first nuclear submarine was launched, 
and in the 1960s, the Northern Fleet became the biggest marine fleet in the Soviet Union 
(Hønneland, 2005). During that time, heavy militarization of the region was a central element 
of Norway’s High North security policy, both in response to the power-struggle between two 
superpowers and to secure national borders (Hoogensen Gjørv & Goloviznina, 2014).  
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For more than 40 years, strategic and geopolitical interest in the High North was 
shaped by the logic of the Cold War and the region’s inaccessibility.  
The High North is still an area of strategic military interest, among other things 
because a large proportion of Russia’s nuclear forces are located there and the region 
is used as a site for military exercises involving important aircraft and naval units. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 18) 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a shift away from the military 
driven security approach in the Artic, towards an emphasis on regional and international 
cooperation. The Arctic Council was initiated in 1998, based on a growing concern for the 
Arctic environment. The circumpolar cooperation was officially formed in 1996 by signing 
the Ottawa declaration, and composed of the eight Arctic states: USA, Canada, Russia, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Denmark (Greenland). The heavy militarization of the 
region, and the increasing anxiety around the mounting nuclear waste, drove the Arctic states 
to facilitate circumpolar cooperation, and in recent times has grown to include matters beyond 
environmental concerns. Due to climate change and melting ice, the region is ‘opening’ up for 
further resource exploration, expanding fishing grounds and shipping routes, which increases 
the need for international cooperation and agreements between the Arctic states. Moreover, 
security concerns in the Arctic now include fields such as economics, energy, environment 
and social security. 
In light of the climatic changes affecting the Arctic and the increased international 
attention around the region, the Norwegian Government has identified the High North as 
“Norway’s most important strategic foreign policy priority” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2012, p. 9). The heightened focus around the Arctic, due to the opportunistic consequences of 
global warming, allows the Arctic States to gain access to areas previously covered with 
impenetrable ice. From a realist perspective, security is about every state securing their own 
sovereignty and power in an anarchistic world (Rottem, 2010). From this perspective, Arctic 
security should be concerned with securing territory and claiming access over resources, 
causing increased tension between the Arctic states. This has been widely debated, and one of 
the most cited sceptics to a peaceful Arctic ‘scramble’ was the former US coast guard Scott 
Borgerson. He is quoted in an article from Foreign Affairs from 2008, saying “[w]ithout U.S. 
leadership to help develop diplomatic solutions to competing claims and potential conﬂicts, 
the region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources” (Borgerson, 2008, n.p.). Stokke 
(2011) however, argues that the conditions for a peaceful resource management of the Arctic 
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is favourable due to the ‘dynamic governance structure’ already in place. The Law of the Sea 
forms the governing body responsible for settling territorial disputes and is mostly respected 
by the Arctic nations. Delimitations of the Arctic maritime zones were already well underway 
when the ‘scramble’ for resources became a topic, and there are clear indications of a 
cooperative tone between the Arctic nations in recent policy statements: “[t]he melting ice and 
expected increase in activity in the Arctic Ocean will make cooperation on the 
implementation of existing instruments and the development of supplementary rules in 
various areas essential.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 61)  
Although ensuring sovereignty and protecting borders is still an important security 
concern in the Arctic region, the Government now places more emphasis on ensuring peaceful 
cooperation and collaboration between Arctic states. This is seen as an important step towards 
the successful governance of Arctic resources and area. In relation to Norway’s relation to its 
biggest neighbour, Russia, cooperation is regarded as one of the ‘main pillars’ of the High 
North Policy: 
Russia is a constructive player in the High North and appears to take the view that its 
interests are best served by keeping tensions low and promoting cooperation. 
Strengthening Norway’s relations with Russia is one of the main pillars of the 
Government’s High North policy. Developing contacts and cooperation across the 
border has a clear security dimension. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 74)    
 5.1.2. Moving away from a traditionalist approach to security  
 In this thesis, the theoretical framework of post-structuralist securitization is applied to 
explain the widening and deepening of the security concept beyond military security. 
Securitizing theory was originally designed with the intent to conceptualize security concerns 
outside military security, and at the same time creating guidelines and criteria for setting 
security apart from other forms of politics (Wæver, 2010, cited in Gad & Peteresen, 2011). 
“Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames 
the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde. 
al., 1998, p. 23). An issue can become politicized, meaning that it is up for political debate, is 
a part of a policy-making process, or under resource allocation and under political decision-
making processes. Alternatively, an issue becomes ‘securitized’, when the issue is seen as a 
threat to the State, requiring emergency action that reaches beyond the bounds of normal 
political processes (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 24). As outlined in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, Hansen (2011) identifies three important aspects, which further ‘deepen’ the 
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securitization framework in a post-structuralist approach, making the framework more 
applicable to the current security debate. First, one should identify the discursive structures 
that represent cases and phenomena and brings them into the larger discursive field. Second, 
we have to look at the underlying knowledge a phenomenon is based on. Finally, it is 
important to outline the foundation and reasons why a security problem is identified as such, 
and what kind of issue constitutes a security problem (Hansen, 2011). Chapter 4 looked at the 
most prominent representations for petroleum development in the High North and how they 
are brought into the overarching High North discourse. I have attempted to link the 
representations with historical patterns in the discourse or global trends and identity building 
that affects the direction of the representations. Lastly, this chapter develops the foundations 
and reasons, or in the words of Hansen (2011), the “substantial modality”, for why certain 
issues reach the security agenda, and what those issues are (p. 357). In the scope of this essay, 
we keep to the governmental policy papers, making the state the central security actor. 
However, as has been discussed, the Government is not a static or isolated institution; rather it 
is affected by a range of interests and information from a varying body of institutions and 
groups. Due to the set limitations of this research, I look at ‘securitizing moves’, which does 
not entail that an issue has been fully ‘securitized’ according to the Copenhagen School. It 
merely entails that the issue has been brought to the agenda as a ‘speech act’, which can be 
identified in the High North political discourse. However, for an issue to be fully ‘securitized’ 
it requires the general audience to accept or obey emergency replies or actions that otherwise 
would not be accepted (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998).  
In the most recent policy papers on the High North, there is now an inclusion of non-
militaristic security issues, which the Government recognizes should be included in a ‘wider’ 
security approach for the Arctic: 
Today the security policy situation in the north is complex and marked by a broad 
range of different risk factors. There is a growing international focus on the High 
North due to issues related to fisheries, energy, the environment and the melting of the 
polar ice. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 37) 
Climate change, easier access to natural resources and growing human activity mean 
that more attention is being focused on the High North, and that there is greater 
potential for both cooperation and conflict of interest. Security policy therefore needs 
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to be based on an extended security concept.22Growing human activity in the region as 
the sea ice melts and retreats is accompanied by a high risk of accidents at sea, 
pollution, and environmental degradation as a result of a growing volume of shipping 
and more use of resources. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 68) 
The inclusion of issues stretching beyond the ‘traditionalist’ approach to security is evident in 
the previous two quotes from the policy papers. The following sections will identify and 
outline these ‘securitization moves’ in the High North policy. This can be further linked to the 
general discourse on energy and environment in the Arctic.  
5.2 Energy security in the Arctic 
 The concept of energy security in the Arctic has gained considerable focus, both 
internationally and in the recent policy papers on the Norwegian High North because of the 
vast unexplored hydrocarbon reserves believed to be increasingly accessible due to global 
warming. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is an ‘intensification’ of the petroleum 
discourse from the current Government, as seen from the opening up of new and highly 
contested areas for resource exploration in the 23rd licencing round. Energy security is a 
concept with altering meanings, depending on how it is used. IEA defines energy security as 
“the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price,” with a division 
between long-term and short-term energy security (IEA, 2015, n.p.). If an energy producing 
country, such as Norway, refers to energy security, it is about ensuring a high level of energy 
production in order to secure steady export levels and economic gain. Whereas, energy 
security for a country relying on imported energy is about securing a stable level of accessible 
energy at a low price, with a high degree of safety and reliance. For Norway, accessibility to 
new petroleum areas in the Arctic is therefore a step in ensuring security of high production 
levels of energy and a high level of income. The role of the Barents Sea as a new energy 
province underlines the Government’s expectations of the future of the region:  
If we move the map a little, we can place the High North in the centre. The High 
North is a kind of new centre, not just on the map, but as a resource area. (…) We now 
see that the presence of oil and gas deposits also opens up the Barents Sea as a new 
European energy province. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 67)  
                                                 
22 «Territorial security, ecological security, economic security, social security and political security» (White 
paper 2011-2012: 68 – footnote)  
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 5.2.1. Norwegian energy security after peak oil 
 In Norway, energy security in the Arctic is linked closely to economic security and 
social security of both the people living in the North and to maintain a high level of national 
welfare. Although the Government does not seem to acknowledge publicly that Norway has 
reached ‘peak oil,’ the production level on the Norwegian continental shelf has steadily 
decreased since the early 2000s, and it is tempting to conclude that the most accessible fossil 
fuel reserves have been developed. Furthermore, in order to maintain the current high 
production levels, new petroleum fields need to be developed. In the policy papers, the 
petroleum development in the Arctic represents a vital corner stone, enabling energy security, 
economic security and social security for people living in the North. Moreover, it ensures a 
high level of welfare and standard of living across the rest of the country: “The oil and gas 
sector is a mainstay of economic activity in the north, and offers unique opportunities for 
value creation, employment and growth, and for generating other positive spin-off effects in 
North Norway…” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 14). 
In the policy papers, there is a representation of a growing petroleum industry as the 
solution to the dwindling of towns and lack of work opportunities for Northerners. 
Hammerfest is used as an example of a success story after the development of the Snøhvit and 
Goliat fields, where ripple effects were created, boosting other industry and economic 
development in the region and ensuring population growth rather than decline (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012). Local environmental concerns are downplayed in favour of growing 
petroleum development; the focus is on securing value-creation, positive ripple effects and 
creating new job opportunities for the local population. Nevertheless, while a developing 
petroleum industry might ensure economic and social security for the local population for a 
time-period, it becomes increasingly apparent that there are strong global forces at play that 
can undermine Norwegian security, creating insecurity when one has become too dependent 
on one single industry. This human security dilemma will be discussed further in section 5.4.  
 5.2.2. Ensuring energy security for a growing global demand 
 Whilst a political rhetoric of ensuring local value creation and social security of people 
living in the North is frequently used when arguing for resource exploration, it is the concept 
of ensuring global energy security that resonates in the Norwegian discourse on energy 
security in the Arctic. The representation of a stable and reliable Norwegian energy supply to 
ensure European and global energy security connects to the established representation of 
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‘drilling for aid.’ In recent years, reports show a steep increase in global demand for energy 
when the developing world is lifted out of poverty. The IEA predicts that the global demand 
for fossil fuels will increase by 50% by 2030 compared to 2006 levels (IEA, 2006). Moreover, 
as we are predicted to reach (or have reached, depending on who interprets the figures) global 
peak oil, there is, according to the IEA, an urgent demand for discovering new hydrocarbon 
resources, as we are facing a deficit of about 12.5 million barrels a day (IEA, 2007). In light 
of this, Norway emerges as a predictable and reliable energy supplier. Norway plays on its 
history of being a small and respected country, while at the same time being a major 
petroleum actor, with a stable and transparent economy safely entrenched in the global market 
(Grindheim, 2009). Not only does petroleum exploration in the High North ensure social 
security for the local population in the North, Norwegian energy can also contribute to 
safeguard global energy security in an increasingly insecure world with big and powerful 
energy nations. This is clearly represented in the following inserts from several policy papers: 
We [Norway] have trust because we are a small, stable and political predictable 
country, and a significant exporter of oil and gas. Norway is close to both Europe and 
the US. We have a common border and interests with Russia. Furthermore, Norway is 
a western OECD country with considerable respect in the Middle East, the Gulf region 
and developing countries with oil economies. We are also fully integrated in the world 
economy, but with an administration model with solid national control over 
Norwegian base. We have a partly state owned oil company (2/3 of the shares), but 
with a broad participation of all the big international companies (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009b, p. 65). 
More recent statements highlight Norway as a reliable energy supplier for Europe, and that 
energy security is furthermore an important global concern: “[o]il and gas deliveries from this 
region can improve European energy security and make an important contribution to global 
energy supplies, and at the same time provide a basis for developing industry and services in 
North Norway” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 15). In addition, this White paper 
outlines: “[i]n our contacts with other states and foreign commercial interests, issues related to 
access to energy and energy security will become increasingly important both in themselves 
and as a part of foreign and security policy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 15). 
However, this representation of a stable Norwegian energy supplier presumes a high 
production level of petroleum. As previously discussed, Norway is experiencing dwindling 
production levels of petroleum and maintaining the same level as in the 2000s, therefore 
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increased production seems an unlikely scenario, especially in a world with decreasing energy 
prices. Fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic is both technologically challenging and costly. 
Nevertheless, as seen in the current Government’s rhetoric, plans to ensure meeting a growing 
demand of global energy security persist as a central element in the High North policy 
making.  
Energy security thus works in coherence with a more state-centric, traditional 
approach to security. Although introducing energy security as a security concept is a widening 
of the traditionalist security agenda, it still revolves around the state’s interest and protection 
of its resources, welfare and income, thereby still fitting the traditionalist state-centric security 
approach. Environmental security on the other hand, also includes a level of ‘human security,’ 
where individual security is drawn into the discourse. Traditionalist views regard the state as 
the ‘security provider,’ while human security makes the individual the security referent 
(Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). Even though the Copenhagen securitizing school does not endorse 
directly the ‘human security’ concept, it opens up for non-state actors to partake in the 
securitizing process: “[t]he essence of the theory is that security can be understood as a 
‘speech act’ through which a particular issue is framed by one or more ‘securitizing actors’ as 
constituting an existential threat to a designated referent object” (Åtland & Pedersen, 2014, p. 
19). The next two sections will first sketch out the environmental security discourse in the 
most recent policy papers, followed by an outline of the concept of ‘opportunistic adaptation’ 
introduced by Kristoffersen (2015). ‘Opportunistic adaptation’ shows how the environmental 
consequences of global warming are highlighted as positive for further development of the 
region, and that the focus should be on adapting to the changing environment rather than 
mitigating the underlying causes of global warming. The final section goes further into the 
‘human security’ debate and highlights the need to include a more individualistic view on 
security as opposed to current state-centric views.  
5.3 Environmental security (‘opportunistic adaptation’) 
 This section shows how environmental security in the Arctic has emerged in the policy 
paper on the High North. Environmental security in the Arctic is presented in the policy 
papers as both vital to the preservation and survival of fragile ecosystems, species, and 
indigenous peoples, in addition to being central to ensuring global environmental security.  
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Long-term, integrated management of the environment and natural resources is crucial 
for securing the livelihoods of present and future generations. The diversity of species 
and habitats is essential for maintaining ecological processes and systems, which in 
turn form the basis for human settlement, value-creation and welfare. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 98) 
 According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), environmental security discourse, as 
opposed to other forms of security discourses (political, societal and economical), is shaped 
by a diverse range of actors, and not merely the state, thus it also includes social movements, 
organizations, governmental departments and epistemic communities. The United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment first manifested the environmental security discourse 
in 1972. In the following decade, Kristoffersen (2014) argues that Norway went through a 
period of ‘environmentalization of the State’, where the voices of environmentalists mixed 
with government officials in important government committees, pushed through new 
environmental regulations, such as clear targets for reduction of CO2 emissions and later a tax 
on CO2 emissions. Due to the early introduction of stringent emission targets and 
environmental taxes, Norway appeared as an international leader on the issue (Kristoffersen, 
2014). This, according to Kristoffersen and Young (2010), reflected an inclusive and open 
Norwegian government, who welcomed environmental organizations in the political debates 
and institutions. However, in the recent decade, as this analysis has shown, the petroleum 
industry has been allowed to partake more in the policy making processes in the High North, 
and turned the environmentalists’ arguments on its head and used it in order to promote 
further exploration in the Arctic. This turn of events has been proceeded by what 
Kristoffersen (2015) has deemed an Arctic policy of ‘opportunistic adaptation.’   
 Kristoffersen’s (2015) article on Opportunistic Adaptation: New discourses on oil, 
equity and environmental security presents ‘opportunistic adaptation’ as an emerging concept 
in the Government’s High North environmental policy. ‘Opportunistic adaptation’ is seen as 
the tendency of Norwegian policy formed by a discourse where the positive consequences of 
climate change in the Arctic are highlighted to a higher extent than the negative 
consequences. Adaptation to the evolving environmental effects of climate change gains 
importance rather than mitigating the underlying causes of climate change, which would 
ultimately reduce the negative consequences in the Arctic and in the rest of the world. An 
example from the 2012 White paper shows this form of ‘opportunistic adaptation:’  
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Climate change, greater access to natural resources and growing human activity 
suggest that the High North will be a region of considerable geopolitical interest. The 
Government’s overall objective is to make use of the opportunities this offers, and at 
the same time manage the environment and the natural resources sustainably, and 
maintain the High North as a peaceful and stable region. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2012, p. 18-19) 
Here, the Government clearly states that climate change leads to greater access to resources 
and opportunities, which the Government will make use of, while the environment and natural 
resources can be ‘managed.’ This in turn will lead to a peaceful and stable region. There is no 
attempt to address the underlying causes of climate change, nor how we can mitigate future 
climate change to limit the extent of the negative consequences of a melting Arctic. 
Furthermore, to claim that the Arctic environment can be ‘managed’ is to undermine the 
enormous powers and resources at stake, located in one of the most inhospitable areas on the 
planet. Nevertheless, the same White paper continues to develop a policy of opportunistic 
adaptation’ for the region: 
(…) the impacts of the changes we are observing in the north may be at least as severe 
and have very serious consequences for people’s living conditions in other parts of the 
world. For example, rising sea levels caused by the melting of inland ice sheets will 
have a major global impact. At the same time, the melting ice is providing greater 
access to resources in the High North and opening up new opportunities for shipping. 
This in turn is leading to growing interest in exploring resources in the Arctic and an 
increase in maritime activity. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 12) 
The Government acknowledges that climate change is causing melting ice and rising sea 
levels, which will severely affect other places in the world, leading to reduced environmental 
security. Notwithstanding these ‘severe consequences’ for people’s lives in other places in the 
world, the main message is that the resources will be available for Norway to exploit, and as 
long as it is managed sustainably, it is the Government’s first priority for the region. In both 
of these White paper statements, the acknowledgement of petroleum exploration as the main 
cause for global climate change in the first place is completely absent from the reasoning, 
keeping these two realities separate in the policy making process. The Government is 
recognizing the paradox we are facing, however, it does not believe that it is Norway’s duty to 
resolve that paradox. Rather, it stands to reason that it is Norway’s duty to make the most out 
of the paradoxical situation, as this will both ensure environmental and energy security: 
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(…) introducing restrictions unilaterally in Norway or in a particular region of the 
world, would probably have limited, or possibly even the opposite effect; in a world 
with increasing demand for energy, I believe imposing such restrictions could result in 
energy substitution of the wrong kind, with coal and heavy oil replacing natural gas. 
My point is – yes, we are facing a paradox. It is not a national or regional paradox, but 
a global one. We must increase out capacity to deal with challenges to economic 
activity. (Støre, 2012) 
This quote is from a speech made by former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, at 
the Offshore Northern Seas Expo in Stavanger, where he connects energy security and 
environmental security to the established story-lines of petroleum exploration in the High 
North. First, Norway should cater to the growing global demand for energy. Furthermore, a 
restriction on ‘environmental’ petroleum exploration in the High North may result in bad 
energy substitution. This relates to the resonance that natural gas is a ‘bridging fuel,’ which 
Norway should exploit for environmental reasons. And finally, there is recognition that we are 
facing a paradoxical situation. Nevertheless, as this paradox is global, the solutions should 
therefore be global. There is a complete de-coupling of two interconnected strands of policy 
that, in the Norwegian perspective, do not seem to connect. The last point clearly links to 
Leichenko and O’Brien’s (2008) argument of ‘double exposure.’ Global environmental 
change and globalisation are often kept apart in two separate discourses, where they are 
compartmentalized and presented as two different areas of policy. The quote from Jonas Gahr 
Støre is an example of this, where the need for us to increase energy supply overshadows the 
reasons for why these energy resources are available in the first place, and the adverse 
consequences that arise for people other places on the planet. Consequently, the multiple 
drivers of climate change and globalization induce positive feedbacks that enables further 
resource exploration, increased trade and transport and a higher net greenhouse gas emissions, 
ultimately causing further climate change (Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008).  
5.4. Human security: the ultimate ‘wide’ security approach?  
 Although the ‘human security’ approach follows a different framework than post-
structuralist securitization theory, Hoogensen Gjørv (2014) argues that the broad framework 
of ‘human security’ does not exclude securitization theory; rather, these two strands of theory 
can work in tandem, not in opposition. So far, I have looked at the security discourse in the 
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Norwegian High North policies and identified a widening of the security concept to include 
‘energy security’ and ‘environmental security.’ This has been done by looking at the ‘speech 
act’ in the form of the written word, which, according to securitization theory, is the way to 
identify emerging security concepts. One of the critiques of the securitization theory is that it 
maintains a state-centric approach to securitization; or to who can be the ‘speech actor’ 
(Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014; Heininen, 2014). Since it is the state which has the ultimate position 
to enforce the ‘emergency measures’ and “actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure”, the state is the ultimate ‘speech actor’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 24). 
The traditionalists’ approach to security carries with it a heavily militarized, nationalistic and 
ideological foundation, and critiques of widening the security concept would claim that 
including non-militaristic issues as security issues would endanger national security 
(Heininen, 2014). However, advocates for a ‘human security’ approach point out that the 
army is not always the best protector against new threats, as it can potentially make a threat 
worse by getting involved militarily. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
saw the need for a new concept to include wider security issues, often with an individualistic 
nature. In 1994, the concept of ‘human security’ was introduced in the Human Development 
Report, where ‘human security’ is defined as ‘freedom from fear, freedom from want’. 
However, the practicality of who acts as the security provider and how security issues are set 
on the agenda and responded to still retains problematic aspects of the widening of the 
security agenda (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). Furthermore, policy making is a fluid process, and 
new security issues come on the agenda, while others falters. This, as previously outlined, 
became evident from the period of ‘environmentalization of the state’ in the 1980s, where 
multiple actors and organizations partook in policy debates around the environmental 
consequences of petroleum exploitation, until recently, when tides turned and other actors, 
such as oil companies, stepped in and took the environmentalists’ seats (Kristofferesen, 2014).  
 Heininen (2014) identifies five issues which should be included in a human security 
approach to Arctic security: pollution and environmental degradation; general environmental 
degradation; utilization and transportation of energy sources; impacts of climate change; 
trans-nationalism and globalization; innovations in governance. These issues, to a lesser or 
larger extent, are covered in the High North policy papers. However, the links that 
interconnect and bring these issues together are not developed in the policy reports, as well as 
including a more individualistic security view. Applying a ‘human security’ approach to these 
issues would contribute to identify and recognize areas, which requires a more individualistic 
approach to security. Previously in this chapter, I touched upon how the Government has 
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portrayed ‘energy security’ as a way of ensuring local value creation, increased welfare and 
jobs for Northern regions. Hence, ‘energy security’ links closely to ‘social security’ and 
‘economic security’. A ‘human security’ approach will include both ecological and 
environmental security, in addition to individual security in the equation for a more holistic 
approach. The Arctic situation illustrates how difficult and integrated these systems are. The 
environmental and ecological consequences of melting Arctic ice can be severe and 
catastrophic for some animals and humans, leading to extinction and mass migration. On the 
other hand, it opens up areas for further resource development and shipping routes. This again 
entails economic opportunities for many people. At the same time, increased traffic and 
pollution might worsen conditions for fishing, reindeer herding and agriculture in local areas. 
On a global scale, a warmer Arctic leads to a global sea level rise, a possible change in the 
oceans currents and a speeding up of global warming, which again is life threatening for 
millions of people living at sea level or in climate-harsh areas. Thus, at the same time, access 
to more petroleum recourses could help bring the developing world out of poverty. The 
widening and deepening of the Arctic security agenda is a crucial step in understanding local 
and global consequences of climate change, the driving forces behind globalisation and global 
environmental change, and to put in perspective the state’s interest versus local and individual 
concerns. However, as pointed out by Hoogensen et al. (2009), “(…) little knowledge exists 
of the creation of security and insecurity, and the identification of threats, at non-state levels 
as dominant state-based security discourses attempt to maintain their stranglehold on what can 
and cannot be called ‘security.’” (p. 4) As long as there is a de-coupling of the causes, drivers 
and consequences of both globalization and global climate change, these human security 
issues will be inadequately addressed. Subsequently, the policy papers on Norwegian High 
North, published by the Foreign Ministry, are collaborative pieces between the concerned 
Ministries, with their own working groups and lobbyists. Identifying the central actors and 
understanding multi-layered policy making processes becomes an important part of the 
agenda setting. Additionally, it is important that local interests groups, individuals, industries,  
organization and others, receive a clearer voice in setting the Arctic security agenda.  
 
5.5. Summary 
The development of Arctic security is one that illustrates well how global security has 
gone through a shift in the period after the Cold War. With the end of the militaristic and 
nuclear security concerns of the Cold War came a reality that revolves around a wider range 
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of security issues. Nuclear waste, pollution and animal welfare became a growing concern for 
the Arctic states, and the High North woke up to a world where there was a need for 
regionalization and international collaboration, as opposed to the strict polarization that had 
defined security politics for so long. The Arctic Council was set up as a response to growing 
concern for the Arctic environment. In the years following the Cold War, there was also a 
need to develop the traditionalist security theory to include a wider conceptualization of the 
new security reality. The Copenhagen School of securitization theory became a popular 
framework to define the widening of the new security agendas. However, many scholars have 
criticised the framework for carrying on a state centric approach to the security actor, and that 
the framework does not draw on the underlying conditions and backgrounds for why 
something becomes a security concern in the first place. A post-structuralist securitization 
theory has been proposed by some of the critiques to build on the securitization theory in 
order to ‘deepen’ the securitization theory (Hansen, 2011). According to Jensen (2015), this 
approach is fruitful in coming to grips with what really goes on with the ‘audience’ in debates, 
deliberations and discourses in the time building up to the policy making. A discourse 
analysis of the policy papers is a further step in understanding the processes leading up to 
securitization, namely describing the ‘securitizing moves’. In the scope of this thesis, the 
‘audience’ has remained a quiet actor, while I have focused on the finished product of the 
policy papers. However, for a further holistic approach to security theory, analysing the role 
of the audience, the actors and the underlying processes are important steps in fully coming to 
grips with the complex security reality today.  
 Furthermore, drawing on ‘human security’ theory, with its focus on individual security 
as well as state security, creates an additional step in ‘widening’ the securitization theory and 
understanding the role of the ‘security actor.’ Arctic security is not only about states 
defending their national interests, territories and resources in order to ensure national welfare, 
economic security, energy security or even environmental security. Grasping Arctic security 
is about understanding the interlinked processes that lead to climate change and set in motion 
a wide array of security process that affects both the state and individuals. On a national level, 
Arctic security is about ensuring energy security, first for local development and value 
creation, then to contribute to global energy security and help the developing world. Arctic 
security is also about environmental security, with a focus on maintaining ecosystems, species 
and a clean and pristine wilderness for the further management and exploitation that enables 
value creation and livelihoods for Norwegians. We see a growing tendency of ‘opportunistic 
69 
 
adaptation’ in the High North (Kristoffersen, 2015). The Government focuses more on the 
positive consequences of climate change and the ‘opening’ up for resource exploration, rather 
than the local and global consequences of rising sea levels, extinction of Arctic species, 
pollution and increased human activity. Consequently, when environmental security is based 
on a state-centric approach, many defining aspects are in danger of being overlooked. A 
human security approach will include a broader range of interests and levels of analysis. 
Hence, a holistic approach to Arctic security should take individual security and underlying 
causes into consideration when forming policies.  
 The development of Arctic security is not a static affair, and while we can learn from 
historical events, build on theories and form new ones, the Arctic is a place where it is 
happening right now. While the Norwegian government has followed a petroleum-focused 
policy for over 30 years, making the petroleum industry the core contributor to local and 
national economic and social security, stronger global forces can as quickly lead to a rising 
insecurity in the petroleum market. In the past months, there has been a significant drop in 
petroleum prices, and this has an immediate effect on economic and social security of people 
living in towns and cities formed around the petroleum industry. The Norwegian media is, as 
we speak, saturated with headlines such as “The unemployment will continue to rise – the oil 
crisis is to blame” (NRK, 29.07.2015), “The oil crisis is worse than the economic crisis” 
(NRK Sørlandet, 18.06.2015), “Analytic about the oil crisis: - We are nowhere close to the 
bottom” (E24, 23.06.2015). If we follow the definition of discourse as the meaning lying 
behind the written word, “[d]iscourse is an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their 
production, dissemination, and reception, which brings an object into being” (Parker, 1992, p. 
3, as sited in Jensen, 2015, n.p.), then bringing the media into the formulation of the 
petroleum discourse becomes meaningful. If we accept that creating discourse is a process 
with many actors, steps and interconnected processes, it translates that security discourse 
should also be a field of many actors, steps and interconnected processes. However, where we 
stand today, the security agenda is primarily set by the state and state actors. Change is thus 
occurring, our understanding of complex processes is widening, and scholars grasp on reality 
is deepening. Hence, viewing the state’s role in environmental governance in a careful, 
optimistic light, shows potential for ‘engagement and renewal’- in the words of Barry and 
Eckersley (2005), then all is not lost for the Norwegian State to take a more integrated view 
on Arctic security and what it means both nationally and internationally.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have been concerned with analysing Norwegian petroleum and 
environmental policies in the High North in the wake of the overarching global paradox 
that we are facing. The global community has declared that global warming should not 
exceed more than 2 degrees, and the most effective way to stop this warming is to limit 
global CO2 emissions. The Arctic is warming faster than anywhere in the world, and the 
future of the Arctic environment will affect the whole planet, in addition to the irrevocable 
changes occurring in the Arctic itself. Norway has named itself a ‘steward’ of the Arctic 
environment, and looks at the environmental developments in the Arctic with growing 
concern. Nevertheless, the Norwegian Government also focuses on the emerging 
opportunities, which the ‘opening’ Arctic presents. Norway is a petroleum nation. Our 
economy and welfare depends on a high level of petroleum extraction. It is this 
unavoidable decoupling of policy thinking, which made me pose the question of why 
Norway wants to carry out resource exploration in the Arctic. Moreover, I wanted to 
uncover the main discourses, which justifies such an exploration and see if I could detect a 
development from the previous Government to the current one. Lastly, in light of the 
policy developments in the Arctic, we now talk of a widening of the Arctic security 
agenda, and I wanted to analyse why this is important for the future security agenda for 
the region.   
The question why Norway wants to carry on resource exploitation in the Arctic might 
seem like an obvious one, with the quick answer – for economic reasons, of course. 
However, when the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs was answering this question at 
the Arctic Frontier conference that was not what he replied. It was then I became fully 
aware of the power of language when powerful people, who none the less are reliant on 
their electors, use language to dilute simple answers to simple questions. Analysing 
political discourse is a way to look under the layers of complexities and ambiguities, to 
start to understand the rules of the game and be aware of who is in and who is out. As the 
short historical summary of the Norwegian petroleum fairy-tale given in chapter 4 
illustrated, we started the oil era with a policy of moderation and heavy state involvement 
to avoid an overheated economy dependent on the black gold. Norway furthermore went 
thought a period of ‘environmentalization of the state’ (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010), 
where environmental organizations had a seat at the front of the table and participated 
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actively in the policy making. However, as our oil production peaked at a record high in 
the beginning of the 2000s, the need to find new areas for exploration became increasingly 
important for the industry. Konkraft became a covert arena where the oil industry and the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy could meet and privately discuss lobby strategies to 
increase the public acceptance for oil exploration in more contested areas. As Ihlen (2007) 
points out, the most important aspect of a company’s or an industry’s reputation, is that it 
is legitimized in the eyes of the public. The petroleum industry has broad public 
acceptance in Norway, and as Ihlen (2007) concludes, there is now an underlying notion 
that ‘what is good for the industry is good for the state.’ This then becomes one of the 
answers to why the Norwegian Government wants to drill for oil in the Arctic. The web of 
players becomes interdependent, and as highlighted in the theory of CDA: 
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help 
produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, 
women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in 
which they represent things and - position people. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 
257) 
Subsequently, it becomes central to pose critical questions relating to power and how power 
translates thought the discourse. Although the petroleum industry has for many years enjoyed 
broad public support and state backing, it is nevertheless detrimental to carry on developing a 
good reputation in the realm of social welfare and environmental stressors. In order to analyse 
this I posed the following question: what are the emerging story-lines and representations 
supporting a development of petroleum exploration in the High North?  
I find in my study of the policy-papers on the High North that there are story-lines and 
representations that are being reproduced and developed from Government to Government, 
including the discourse of ‘drilling for foreign aid’, ‘drilling for the environment’ and ‘natural 
gas as a bridging fuel’. These representations of Norwegian petroleum policy appears to 
intensify and reproduce from the former Government to the current, and  has gone through 
stages of interdiscursivity, where old representations are being reproduced in a ‘new’ way and 
presented as current priorities. The ‘drilling for the environment’ discourse is an example of 
this. The discourse started, according to Hønneland and Jensen (2008) and Jensen (2010) as 
an ‘othering’ of Russia as an environmental foe in the Arctic waters, which Norway had to 
help by setting the precedence of drilling more environmentally. It furthermore developed into  
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what Jensen (2010) has called ‘discourse co-optation’, where one side of the parties [pro-
drilling] takes the main message of the opposing party [no drilling] and makes it the core of 
their own arguments. This was done by the oil companies in the mid- to late. 2000s, where oil 
companies and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy met to lay out the pathways for getting 
the Norwegian public behind an intensified petroleum exploration farther North. Today, 
Norway does not just talk about drilling in the Arctic to set high environmental standards for 
Russia. Rather, Norway presents drilling in the Arctic as the best scenario for the global 
environment, as Norwegian petroleum production standards are one of the best in the world 
(sometimes even portrayed as the best). Therefore, Norway should continue fossil fuel 
exploration to avoid substitute fuel with a worse environmental standard.  
The ‘drilling for aid’ discourse, which the Government has intensified in the last few 
years, can trace its origins in the Norwegian national identity as an altruistic nation that is at 
the forefront of international aid. As I showed in the analysis, the former Minister of 
Petroleum and Energy, Thorhild Widvey brought forward the discourse of ‘drilling for aid’ 
ten years ago. This story-line has been reproduced and further developed by the latter 
Governments, and most recently, it has been one of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs 
main argument for why Norway should continue exploring in the Arctic waters. However, as 
pointed out by Ryggvik (2010), the developing world does not necessarily need polluting and 
expensive fossil fuel from the Arctic waters to move out of poverty. However, their energy 
insufficiencies could be solved by using the income from a tax regime for the use and 
production of fossil fuel, to subsidize a massive development of the renewable industry from 
local wind and solar power.  
The last discourse highlighted in this thesis, is the discourse of natural gas as a ‘bridging 
fuel’. This discourse can be traced back to reports coming from IPCC in 2007, and from IEA 
in 2012, stating that gas as a substitute for coal can substantially decrease CO2 emissions as a 
step towards a low-carbon society. This was an argument that was quickly snapped up by the 
industry and subsequently by the Norwegian Government, especially since Norway has 
developed into a gas-exploiting nation with most of the uncovered resources in the Arctic 
being natural gas. Nevertheless, as was revealed in the analysis, the representation of gas as a 
‘bridging fuel’ says little of the polluting production processes of the gas, neither does it 
guarantee that the production of gas would be a substitute for coal, rather than simply adding 
on to existing production.  
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I was furthermore interested in seeing if there was a change in the discourse between the 
former Government and the current, and posed the question in what ways is the newly instated 
Government from 2013 developing the discourse around petroleum and environmental 
policies in the Arctic? Although it is still too early to draw any conclusions as to whether or 
not the new Government will indeed go from ‘word to action’ in the High North petroleum 
policy, it does appear that the current Government means to carry out a more deterministic 
and intensive petroleum politic in the High North. At least there is no indication that the 
sitting Government intends to change the developing course of action, and the representations 
of ‘drilling for the environment’, ‘drilling for aid’ and the representation of gas as a ‘bridging 
fuel’ are reproduced and even represented more forcefully. A perplexing discovery was made 
when I looked at the difference between the Norwegian and English translation of the most 
recent policy paper from 2014, where the Norwegian version showed more force and resolve 
as opposed to the English version in carrying out petroleum exploration in the Arctic. I can 
only speculate as to the reasoning behind this. Is it merely a case of meanings lost in 
translation, or is it a deliberate action in order to portray a different image outwards to the 
international community? This could potentially be the theme of a whole new thesis: to see 
whether or not there is a difference in the discourse of the national and international policy 
papers in Norwegian foreign policy making.  
I have not conducted a discourse analysis to discredit all the arguments that the 
Government makes about continuing fossil fuel exploration in the High North. There might 
indeed be some validity in the claims that natural gas is less carbon intensive than coal, or that 
the developing world needs energy to fight poverty. Furthermore, that the Norwegian 
petroleum industry can boast about following high environmental standards is of course better 
than the alternative. However, the Norwegian Government, although heavily involved, is not 
just a mouthpiece for the oil industry. It represents a wide public interest, different kinds of 
industries and is moreover, the ‘stewards’ of the environment.  It is, in my opinion, important 
to analyse policy papers and statements with a broader perspective than just from the main 
industry of our country. Especially in times when this industry is being heavily blamed for the 
human-made climate changes that, if not haltered in time, will entail unimaginable 
consequences for everyone living on this planet.  
My last research question therefore asked: Why should we talk about a ‘widening’ of the 
Arctic security agenda, and why is the concept of ‘human security’ important in the case of 
the Arctic. The Government clearly states that the changes happening in wake of global 
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warming, requires an ‘extended’ security agenda, to include issues such as energy, economic, 
environmental and social security. Nevertheless, as the analysis clarifies, energy security has 
become the most prominent concern. First by ensuring local economic and social security, 
then to contribute to global energy security where a reliable supply of Norwegian energy 
resources plays a key role. Environmental security comes in the shadow of this security 
strategy, and as Kristoffersen (2015) shows, there is a tendency of talking about a warmer 
Arctic in terms of the positive opportunities for further resource exploration, shipping routes 
and new fishing grounds. This policy of ‘opportunistic adaptation’ is clearly visible in the 
recent policy statements, and underlines the need to not just ‘widen’ the security agenda, as 
proposed by the securitization theory, but also ‘ deepen’ the security agenda by adapting a 
‘human security’ approach. A melting Arctic will affect millions of people in many different 
ways, and only by adapting a more comprehensive security concept in the case of the High 
North, will the Government be able to conduct policy making that reflects the true security 
concerns of both the country and its people. 
In addition to outline prominent discourses from the Norwegian Government concerning 
the High North petroleum and energy policies, the overall impression of Norway’s High 
North agenda is one where there is a need to find a more holistic and interdisciplinary 
approach to the policy making process. There is a decoupling of the two strands of policies, 
and when highlighted, it weakens the Government’s arguments, both in terms of being a 
‘steward’ of the Arctic environment, and also of the real intent for why the Government want 
to pursue resource exploration in one of the most vulnerable areas in the world. However, in 
order for the Government to adapt a more ‘honest’23 discourse, and a fully comprehensive 
security agenda, it has to come to terms with some emerging realities, which would all be 
interesting for further study: 1. Norway has become more dependent on the petroleum 
industry than we want to admit. 2. There are very close ties between the Government and the 
petroleum industry that creates ambiguities and paradoxes in the policy-making concerning 
the High North. 3. Norway has reached peak oil, and there is a growing need to invest and 
develop other types of industries. 4. Norway is not as ‘environmental’ as we want to be, and 
in order to claim proper ‘environmentalism to the world’ we have to start making some real 
changes, first with our dependency of the petroleum industry. 5. A comprehensive approach 
to Arctic security has to take into account the individual security concerns from the millions 
                                                 
23 These observations are of course the author’s own opinions as an afterthought of the work she has done for 
the past few months, and might be considered ‘wrong’ by others.  
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of people who will be affected by the melting ice, including indigenous and local people 
above the Arctic Circle, and all those affected by rising sea level in the world. 6. The 
Norwegian Government should include more mitigation policies rather than keeping a focus 
on (opportunistic) adaptation to climate change. It is not too late to put the brakes on global 
warming; however, it would entail a shift away from looking at the positive consequences of 
the melting ice, to concentrate on how to stop the worrying development of an ice-free Arctic.  
Analysing the continuing development of Norwegian policy-making in the High North is 
a vital step in unravelling and decoding the complex and multi-layered discourse. For anyone 
who is interested in Norway’s High North policy, it surely is a time of change and surprises, 
which can take the policy-making to unknown territories. In current time, the drastic decrease 
in global oil prices over the past few months affects the speed and incentives for oil 
companies to carry out expensive and uncertain exploration in the High North. No one knows 
how long the oil prices will be as low as they are now, and this might provide a window for 
the environmental discourse to once more gain some footing in the debate. It furthermore 
illustrates that our economy is heavily dependent on the petroleum industry and that there are 
strong global forces at play, which Norway has no power over. Realizing this, might entice 
the public to request a more diversified economy and a shift towards renewables energies.  
Consequently, conducting this research on Norwegian policy making in the High North 
has only made me more determined that it is indeed Norway’s most important foreign policy 
area. However, it is where Norway has a chance of proving itself a true ‘steward’ of the 
environment, and show that we are determined to not breech 2-degree warming by changing 
focus from a petroleum driven policy path to a more holistic and integrated approach of 
renewables and low-carbon development strategies.  
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